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Righting the Record: A Response to the
GAO’s 2004 Report Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo: Findings and
Possible Options Regarding
Longstanding Community Land Grant
Claims in New Mexico
ABSTRACT
In 2004, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a
Report entitled Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: Findings and
Possible Options Regarding Longstanding Community Land
Grant Claims in New Mexico (GAO Report), in which it
analyzed whether the federal government violated any legal duties
to community land grant heirs in New Mexico following the
signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. The GAO Report
concluded that the government fulfilled any duties it may have had
to grantees and heirs, and that potential remedies for the massive
land losses were up to Congress as a matter of public policy rather
than as a matter of legal obligation.
The following analysis, commissioned by the New Mexico
Attorney General as a legal and historical response to the GAO
Report, critiques the GAO’s analysis and conclusions regarding a
number of legal issues, including the federal obligations under the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and international law, the extent to
which community land grants were properly confirmed by the
United States, the legal and historical implications of these
misconfirmations, and the breach of constitutional due process
guarantees in the confirmation process.

* David Benavides is director of the land and water rights project for New Mexico
Legal Aid. He received his B.S. from the University of New Mexico and his J.D. from the
University of New Mexico School of Law. Upon graduation from law school, Benavides was
awarded a Skadden, Arps Public Interest Law Fellowship to work on land and water rights
in northern New Mexico. He has assisted land grants in retaining their common lands against
various legal threats. Ryan Golten is an attorney with New Mexico Legal Aid’s land and
water rights project, where she represents acequias and land grants in protecting their land
and water rights and exercising local decision-making authority over these community
resources. Ryan received her B.A. from University of Michigan and J.D. from the University
of New Mexico School of Law. Ryan clerked for Chief Justice Edward Chávez on the New
Mexico Supreme Court in 2004–05.The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions
of historian Mark Schiller and University of New Mexico School of Law students Kristina
Fisher and Amanda Garcia, whose research assistance made this report possible.
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The issue of the federal government’s role in the loss of New
Mexico’s land grants is a significant one. This response to the GAO
Report aspires to deepen the discussion and illuminate areas that
merit Congress’s consideration. Hopefully this analysis will help
pave the way for meaningful redress for New Mexico’s land grant
communities, which have suffered terrible losses since the signing
of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
INTRODUCTION
Much has been said and written about the land grant confirmation
process in New Mexico under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (Treaty).
In 2004, the federal government published a long-awaited study assessing
whether the federal government fulfilled its obligations under the Treaty
and the U.S. Constitution, in light of the massive losses of community land
grant lands in New Mexico following the Treaty.1 The Government
Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that the federal government fulfilled
its duties under the Treaty and Constitution, and that any remedy for the
land losses was up to Congress as a matter of policy. This response is an
attempt to address that conclusion and the GAO’s analysis.
Our critique of the GAO Report is divided into the following topics:
(1) the GAO’s analysis of the duty owed under the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and its interpretation of the congressional actions implementing
that duty; (2) the fact that most community grants were not confirmed as
they existed under Mexican and Spanish law and the disastrous effects of
those misconfirmations; (3) the GAO’s mistaken reliance on a since-reversed
state district court decision in the case of Montoya v. Tecolote,2 and the notion
that wrongful confirmations could be collaterally attacked in state court; (4)
the fact that many post-confirmation land losses were direct results of the
improper nature of confirmations, rather than attributable simply to the
actions of land grant heirs themselves; (5) an analysis of the cases and
circumstances in which grants were improperly rejected and discouraged
from being pursued; and (6) an analysis of the lack of due process under the
federal confirmation process.

1. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO: FINDINGS AND
POSSIBLE OPTIONS REGARDING LONGSTANDING COMMUNITY LAND GRANT CLAIMS IN NEW
MEXICO (2004) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d0459.pdf.
2. The district court was reversed by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Montoya v.
Tecolote Land Grant, 2008-NMCA-014, 143 N.M. 413, 176 P.3d 1145, cert. quashed as
improvidently granted, 2008-NMCERT-001, 143 N.M 398, 176 P.3d 1130.

Fall 2008]

THE GAO’S 2004 REPORT

859

This response does not pretend to be the final word on the legal
history of land grants in New Mexico though it is certainly one of the most
extensive legal analyses that has been done to date. We do not pretend to
address all of the topics and arguments exhaustively, as our purpose is to
critique the GAO Report where we disagree with its analysis and
conclusions, and to identify areas meriting further research.
Certainly the topic of the federal government’s role in the loss of
New Mexico’s land grants, particularly in terms of common lands, is a
significant one. Our hope is to deepen the discussion and illuminate
important points for Congress’s consideration. More than anything, we
hope to pave the way for meaningful redress for New Mexico’s land grant
communities, who have suffered terrible losses since the signing of the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
I. THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO
AND THE DUTY OWED
In its 2004 report, the GAO concludes the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo was not self-executing, and consequently the federal government
had no legal duty to land grantees to recognize land grants to the extent
they would have been recognized by Mexico. In doing so, the GAO ignores
the more nuanced historical question of whether Congress in fact intended,
through the Treaty and subsequent legislation in 1854 and 1891, to protect
land grants to the extent they would have been recognized by Mexico at
that time. Arguably, Congress did intend to do so, as suggested by U.S.
Supreme Court decisions during the first half of the nineteenth century.
Later courts may have misinterpreted Congress’s intent or misapplied
congressional directions surrounding the Treaty and subsequent legislation,
as pressure increased to settle and market western lands. If so, Congress has
the prerogative to legislatively overrule such cases and restore its intent as
articulated in the Treaty and Acts of 1854 and 1891. This discussion was
entirely overlooked by the GAO and bears serious consideration.
A. Self-Executing Treaties and the Early Evolution of Supreme Court
Decisions
According to the GAO, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was not
self-executing, and therefore Congress had discretion to craft a process for
confirming land grants without any legal duty to do so as Mexico would
have done.3 Under this view, because there was no legal duty established
by the Treaty, no legal rights could have been violated except for under the

3.

GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 99.
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U.S. Constitution, and any concern that the Treaty was breached would
have been a matter for Mexico to raise in an international forum.4 According
to this view, however unfortunate or inequitable the federal process may
have been, any flaws short of due process violations raise purely political
rather than legal questions.5
There are a number of problems with this reasoning, beginning
with the GAO’s summary conclusion that the Treaty was not self-executing
and therefore did not provide any legal duty or individual rights. As the
GAO explains, whether a Treaty is self-executing depends on whether it
“requires implementing legislation before becoming effective.”6 If a treaty
does not require implementing legislation, individual rights are protected
under the treaty itself and will be recognized by courts of law on that basis
without further actions by Congress.7 However, whether a treaty requires
such implementing legislation is not as clear-cut as the GAO suggests.8 No
distinction was made between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties
until the case of Foster v. Neilson,9 where the Court began attempting to
delineate a hierarchy between federal treaties and statutes.10 Foster held the
1819 Treaty of Cession between the United States and Spain, which
governed the ceded territory of West Florida, did not “operate[] of itself
without the aid of any legislative provision” because of its provision that
Spanish land grants made prior to a specified date “shall be ratified and
confirmed,” essentially requiring some act of Congress before creating
binding rights.11
Four years later, however, the Court reversed itself in United States
v. Percheman,12 holding that the same provision was in fact self-executing as
to land grants that would have been entitled to recognition under Spain.
The Court construed the treaty at issue in light of the rules and practices
among nations that are sufficiently well-established as to be considered
legally binding without any express treaty or act, also known as “customary
international law” or the “law of nations.”13 Applying the customary
international law of the time, the Court explained that land titles belonged

4. Id. at 98–99.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 99.
7. See United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 89, 91–92 (1833).
8. See Christine Klein, Treaties of Conquest: Property Rights, Indian Treaties, and the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 26 N.M. L. REV. 201, 220 (1996).
9. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
10. See Klein, supra note 8, at 218–19.
11. Foster, 27 U.S. at 314–15.
12. 32 U.S. 51, 89 (1833).
13. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708–12 (1900).
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to individuals, not the sovereign, and were to be unaffected by changes in
sovereignty:
A cession of territory is never understood to be a cession of
the property belonging to its inhabitants. The King cedes that
only which belonged to him; lands he had previously
granted, were not his to cede…The cession of a territory, by
its name, from one sovereign to another, conveying the
compound idea of surrendering at the same time the lands
and the people who inhabit them, would be necessarily
understood to pass the sovereignty only, and not to interfere
with private property.14
Applying principles of treaty construction, the Court rejected any construction of the Treaty that would have required a perfect title to be subject to
investigation and confirmation by this government or be forfeited, since any
such construction would run counter to this law of nations.15 Congress, it
stated, could not have intended to subject otherwise perfect grants “valid
under the Spanish government, or by the law of nations, to the
determination of [the federal] commissioners.”16 The Court held the
language of the Florida treaty should have been translated to state that
perfected grants “shall remain ratified,” rather than “shall be ratified” by
some affirmative act.17
Other U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the first half of the
nineteenth century followed Percheman in emphasizing the customary
international legal principle that perfect titles under a former sovereign
retained their valid and perfect status under the new sovereign.18 Since that
time, customary international law has been held to be binding on U.S.
courts in the absence of clear treaty language or domestic law to the
contrary.19

14. Perchman, 32 U.S. at 87.
15. Id. at 86–89.
16. Id. at 91–92.
17. Id. at 88–89.
18. See Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. 176, 177 (1857) (stating that, after the change in
sovereignty, “private relations, their rights vested under the Government of their former
allegiance, or those arising from contract or usage, remained in full force and
unchanged…This is the principle of the law of nations.”); United States v. Wiggins, 39 U.S.
334, 350 (1840) (stating that titles perfected under a foreign sovereign were “intrinsically
valid…and…need[ed] no sanction from the legislative or judicial departments of this
country.”); accord United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. 691 (1832).
19. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 78; Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
(“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts
of justice of appropriate jurisdiction.”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004)
(“For two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes
the law of nations…It would take some explaining to say now that federal courts must avert
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For the following several decades, including following the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Supreme Court closely followed its analysis in
Percheman when construing treaties of concession and property rights in
light of customary international legal principles.20 However, in the later part
of the nineteenth century, the Court abruptly departed from this reasoning
in Botiller v. Dominguez,21 the case relied upon by the GAO for its conclusion
that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was not self-executing. In Botiller, the
question was whether, under the Treaty, Congress could require otherwise
perfected land grants in California to be presented to the land claims
commission within two years or else forfeited.22 The Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the California Supreme Court, which had construed
the Act of 1851 in light of the Treaty and underlying law of nations, holding
that Congress could not have intended a perfected land grant from the
Mexican government to be lost for failure to present the claim within the
two-year deadline.23 In reversing, the Supreme Court omitted any
discussion of customary international law in existence at the time of the
Treaty. Instead, it concluded that Congress’s two-year deadline for filing
claims, whether perfect or imperfect, was a reasonable administrative
requirement not in conflict with the Treaty’s private property provisions.24
Further, it stated that, if Congress violated the terms of the Treaty, this was
strictly a matter of international law.25
Botiller marked a dramatic shift from the reasoning in Percheman
and other treaty construction cases up to that point suggesting the Treaty
provisions were self-executing as to perfect grants. It also signaled the
Court’s increasing willingness to defer to Congress on matters involving the
settlement of western lands, even when such decisions arguably went
against its earlier pronouncements involving treaty rights.26 Surprisingly,
Botiller did not even mention Percheman, a decision decided only a decade
before the negotiation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo and still good
law at the time.
Perhaps even more surprisingly, in relying on Botiller the GAO did
not mention this notable omission or the long line of cases leading up to the
Supreme Court’s shift in Botiller. Nonetheless, in describing the history of

their gaze entirely from any international norm intended to protect individuals.”) (internal
citations omitted).
20. See, e.g., Wiggins, 39 U.S. at 350; Leitensdorfer, 61 U.S. at 177; United States v. Moreno,
68 U.S. 400 (1863).
21. Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238, 244 (1889).
22. See id. at 246–47.
23. Minturn v. Brower, 24 Cal. 644, 662–63, 672 (1864).
24. Botiller, 130 U.S. at 250.
25. Id. at 247.
26. See Klein, supra note 8, at 222–23.
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the Treaty and the circumstances of its negotiation and signing, even the
GAO acknowledges: “Then, as now, international law generally required
a successor sovereign to recognize the property rights of a former
sovereign’s citizens to the same extent provided under the laws and
practices of the prior sovereign.”27 Even later Supreme Court cases
emphasized these same international law principles when considering the
validity of land grants under the Treaty, albeit inconsistently.28
Having omitted any critique of Botiller, the GAO recounts a history
of the Treaty as if the negotiators and Congress at the time did not believe
they were bound by the fundamental principle of international law
announced in the Percheman line of cases. Like the first, this second omission
merits scrutiny.
B. The Signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
As explained by the GAO, after the initial phase of negotiation, the
Senate deleted Article X of the Treaty, which specifically protected land
grants to the same extent as if the territory had remained under Mexico:
All grants of land made by the Mexican government, or by
the competent authorities, in territories previously appertaining to Mexico, and remaining for the future within the limits
of the United States, shall be respected as valid to the same extent
that the same grants would be valid if the said territories had
remained within the limits of Mexico. But the grantees of land in
Texas, put in possession thereof, who, by reason of the
circumstances of the country since the beginning of the
troubles between Texas and the Mexican government, may
have been prevented from fulfilling all the conditions of their
grants, shall be under the obligation to fulfill the said
conditions within the periods limited within the same
respectively; such periods to be now counted from the date of
the exchange of ratifications of this treaty.29
The first part of the Article was similar to language in the 1819 treaty with
Spain later held in Percheman to be self-executing as to perfect grants.30
However, the U.S. commissioners explained to Mexico that Article X was

27. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 27–29.
28. See, e.g., Ely’s Adm’r v. United States, 171 U.S. 220 (1898) (emphasizing duty under
Treaty and law of nations to recognize grants to the extent Mexico would have) and related
discussion below.
29. Interstate Land Co. v. Maxwell Land Grant Co., 139 U.S. 569, 588–90 (1891) (emphasis
added).
30. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 28, 175; United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51,
87–88 (1833).
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deleted because of its provision allowing imperfect grants in Texas extra
time to satisfy their grant conditions. Nonetheless they assured the
Mexicans that Articles VIII and IX “secured property of every kind
belonging to Mexicans, whether held under Mexican grants or otherwise.”31
President Polk provided the same explanation for the deletion of Article X,
emphasizing that other language in the Treaty protected land grants to the
extent they would have been recognized under Mexico:
The objection to the Xth article of the original treaty was not
that it protected legitimate titles, which our laws would have
equally protected without it, but that it most unjustly attempted
to resuscitate grants which had become mere nullities, by
allowing the grantees the same period after the exchange of
the ratifications of the treaty, to which they had been
originally entitled after the date of their grants, for the
purpose of performing the conditions on which they had been
made.32
This explanation was reiterated in the Protocol of Querétaro (Protocol), in
which the Mexicans reiterated their understanding that the deletion of
Article X was not intended to annul land grants and that such grants would
retain their “legitimate titles.”
The American government by suppressing the Xth article of
the Treaty of Guadalupe did not in any way intend to annul
grants of lands made by Mexico in the ceded territories. These
grants, notwithstanding the suppression of the article of the
Treaty, preserve the legal value which they may possess; and
the grantees may cause their legitimate titles to be
acknowledged before the American tribunals.33
Because the U.S. Senate never voted on the Protocol, and it was not
included in the ratified Treaty documents, it is disputed whether the
Protocol was intended to be part of the Treaty. While Mexico considered the
Protocol binding and relied on its assertions to preserve and protect land
grants, the U.S. position is that the Protocol is not in any way binding.34
Certainly there is no clear answer for why Article X was deleted. On
the one hand, officials including the President appear to have wanted to

31. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 30; see RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, THE TREATY
GUADALUPE HIDALGO 44, 48 (1992); Interstate Land Co., 139 U.S. at 588–90 (attributing
elimination of Article X to U.S. refusal to recognize imperfect land titles).
32. See Interstate Land Co., 139 U.S. at 589 (emphasis added).
33. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 31, 178 (quoting Second Provision, Protocol of
Querétaro).
34. Id. at 31–32. See MALCOLM EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS AND LAWSUITS IN NORTHERN NEW
MEXICO 29–30 (1994) [hereinafter EBRIGHT].
OF
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remove Article X because of concerns about the inchoate titles in Texas, as
described above. Others, more interested in land speculation and clearing
the way for manifest destiny in the West, may have wanted to exclude
Article X because of its similarity to the language of the 1819 Treaty
discussed in Percheman involving perfect titles. Once this language was
deleted, it was easier to argue the Treaty was not self-executing, even as to
perfect claims, so that Congress could unilaterally determine the scope of
the Treaty’s protections, despite the fact that such a construction was
arguably contrary to principles of customary international law as discussed
above.
The scope of the Treaty’s land grant protections in the absence of
Article X, and the legal significance of the Protocol, continue to be matters
of legal debate.35 Certainly after Botiller it became increasingly difficult to
argue that the Treaty provided substantive rights to those it was initially
intended to protect. This argument was made more difficult by the ways in
which courts narrowly interpreted the federal legislation designed to
implement the Treaty in New Mexico.
C. The Court’s Narrowing Implementation of the Federal Legislation
As described by the GAO, following the Treaty, Congress
established the Office of the Surveyor General to settle land grant claims in
the Territory of New Mexico. The Act of 1854 directed the Surveyor General
to “ascertain the origin, nature, character and extent of all claims to land
under the laws, usages, and customs of Spain and Mexico” and to
recommend such claims to Congress for confirmation or rejection.36 The
Surveyor General was then instructed to report to the validity of these
claims “under the laws, usages, and customs of the country before its
cession to the United States.”37 Twice, the Act expressly directed the
Surveyor General to examine land grants as the Spanish and Mexican
governments would have, adding that the purpose of the Act was to
“confirm bona fide grants and give full effect to the treaty.”38 There appears
to have been little dispute at the time that Congress, in enacting the 1854
legislation, intended to recognize land grants to the extent that they would
have been recognized under Spanish and Mexican law.39 The GAO

35. See, e.g., id. at 35.
36. Act of July 22, 1854, ch. 108, § 8, 10 Stat. 308, 309 (establishing the Offices of SurveyorGeneral in New Mexico, Kansas, and Nebraska).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 56 (acknowledging the Department of the Interior’s
instructions to the Surveyor General to recognize grants in New Mexico “precisely as Mexico
would have done”).
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concluded, however, that Congress had a different, and significantly
narrower, purpose in enacting the Act of 1891.40 Following years of delay,
resulting in part from the halt in land grant confirmations during the Civil
War and the large backlog of claims, and in part from the concern regarding
fraudulent land speculation after the confirmation of a number of large
private grants, Congress established the Court of Private Land Claims
(CPLC) to resolve the numerous pending claims not yet resolved under the
Surveyor General process.41 The CPLC proceedings and appeals to the
Supreme Court were to be conducted “as courts of equity,” and were to be
“guided” by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, international law, and the
laws of Mexico.42 Unlike the Act of 1854, however, the 1891 Act omitted the
specific reference to custom and usage as a source of law. Instead, it
instructed the CPLC to approve land grants “lawfully and regularly
derived” under the laws of Spain and Mexico in accordance with Treaty
provisions and principles of international and Mexican law.43
Although the 1891 legislation did not include equity as a distinct
source of law, in contrast to the earlier legislation in 1851 and 1854
governing California and New Mexico land grant claims, proceedings were
to be conducted “as courts of equity.” As the GAO acknowledges, the scope
of the courts’ equity jurisdiction was unclear under the language of the 1891
Act.44 Nonetheless, the fact that courts were to evaluate claims in
accordance with international law and Treaty provisions, and “according
to the practice of the courts of equity,” suggests courts were bound to honor
titles to the extent they would have been recognized by Spain or Mexico,
and to temper the “lawfully and regularly derived” directive with equitable
considerations.
Indeed, some cases arising under the Act of 1891 applied principles
of equity, the Treaty provisions, and the laws of nations to confirm grants
with various technical infirmities. For instance, in Ely’s Administrator v.
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the granting official had
authority to issue the grant in light of the customary practice of doing so,
even when the laws in place at the time were ambiguous as to his
authority.45 The Court emphasized the duty that existed under the Treaty
and law of nations to recognize titles to the extent that Mexico would

40. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 539, 26 Stat. 854.
41. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 54–76; EBRIGHT, supra note 34, at 45.
42. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 539, § 7, 26 Stat. 854 at 857.
43. Id. at 857, § 7 (directing the CPLC to evaluate claims “according to the law of nations,
the stipulations of the Treaty…and the laws and ordinances of the Government from which
it is alleged to have been derived”); see GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 78.
44. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 81–82.
45. Ely’s Adm’r v. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 223–24, 240 (1898).
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have,46 as well as the courts’ equitable powers under the 1891 Act to look
behind the technical rules to ascertain the proper boundaries of a Mexican
grant.47 In so doing, the Court underscored the following fundamental
equitable principals:
It must be remembered, in this connection, that, by section 7
of the act creating the court of private land claims, it is
provided “that all proceedings subsequent to the filing of said
petition shall be conducted as near as may be according to the
practice of the courts of equity of the United States.”
Therefore in an investigation of this kind that court is not
limited to the dry, technical rules of a court of law, but may inquire
and establish that which equitably was the land granted by the
government of Mexico. It was doubtless the purpose of
congress, by this enactment, to provide a tribunal which
should examine all claims and titles, and that should, so far as
was practicable in conformance with equitable rules, finally settle
and determine the rights of all claimants.48
Likewise, in United States v. Chaves,49 a case involving the Cubero Grant, the
Supreme Court upheld a CPLC decision that oral evidence could be used
in place of written documents to prove the existence of a valid land grant,
based in large part on the laws of nations and Treaty obligation to confirm
grants that would have been valid under Mexico.50
These cases cast into doubt the GAO’s assertions that Congress in
the Act of 1891 precluded any consideration of equity and principles other
than the strict letter of the law as it existed under Mexico.51 Contradictory
decisions during the CPLC era point less to any clear statement about
Congress’s intent in the 1891 legislation than to the lack of clarity in the
statute regarding the role of equity, as well as an adversarial system in
which the increasingly technical arguments of government lawyers,
responding to pressure to keep as much land as possible in the public
domain for settlement and speculation, were able to prevail.52 The obvious

46. Id. at 223 (“It was undoubtedly the duty of Congress…to recognize and establish
every title and right which, before the cession, Mexico recognized as good and valid”).
47. Id. at 240.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. United States v. Chaves, 159 U.S. 452, 456 (1895).
50. See EBRIGHT, supra note 34, at 50–51.
51. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 113–23 (relying on cases such as United States v.
Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278 (1897), Hayes v. United States, 170 U.S. 637 (1898), and others that
applied the earlier, technical holdings of United States v. Vigil, 80 U.S. 449 (1871), and United
States v. Cambuston, 61 U.S. 59 (1857)).
52. See, e.g., EBRIGHT, supra note 34, at 45–50, 136–39.
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due process concerns regarding such a system are discussed in Part VI
below.
Despite notable exceptions, the U.S. Supreme Court increasingly
rejected otherwise perfect grants based on technicalities that arguably
would not have resulted in rejection under Mexico and may have been
inconsistent with the Treaty and/or the law of nations. Reversing its
analysis in earlier decisions such as United States v. Chaves for instance, the
Court in Hayes v. United States relied exclusively on the “lawfully and
regularly derived” language in rejecting a grant made by the territorial
deputation in 1825, before regulations were in place that may have
prohibited such an entity from making grants in New Mexico.53 The Court
disregarded that this appeared to be the customary practice of the time,
implicitly sanctioned by Mexican government, and also ignored the fact that
earlier courts had looked beyond similar technicalities under each of the
federal acts for New Mexico and California land grants where a grant
otherwise appeared to be valid.54
Similarly, later cases tended to more narrowly interpret the 1891
Act as disallowing confirmations based on copies of grant documents where
the originals had been lost or destroyed.55 Such holdings have been much
criticized by legal scholars for being overly technical, in addition to being
remarkably out of touch with the official custom and practice on the New
Mexican frontier.56 Because there were no official notaries in the New
Mexico territory, for instance, in many cases where original papers were lost
or destroyed, descendants of the original grantees sought and received
copies of the original document, along with a certification that the copy
mirrored the original, from the highest local government official.57 By

53. Hayes, 170 U.S. at 643–48.
54. E.g., Ely’s Adm’r v. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 224 (1898) (just three years earlier,
reaching the opposite conclusion as Hayes under similar facts); Fremont v. United States, 58
U.S. 541, 561–62 (1854) (upholding validity of Grant, even when territorial official dispensed
with strict legal requirements in making grant, based on evidence of such customary practice
in Territory); cf. Crespin v. United States, 168 U.S. 208, 217 (1897) (rejecting Grant on its facts,
but recognizing that some grants made by otherwise unauthorized officials received approval
of Mexican government); see Klein, supra note 8, at 228, n.206.
55. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 121–23 (discussing the Town of La Cieneguilla and
Embudo grants, in which Supreme Court held that, where the original grant documents had
been lost, copies of grant documents were insufficient to confirm the grant under the 1891
Act). However, as even the GAO acknowledges, even as late as the 1890s the CPLC continued
to confirm land grants where original grant papers were missing. Such cases included the La
Majada, Cubero, Santa Cruz, Black Mesa, and Town of Bernalillo land grants. See GAO
REPORT, supra note 1, at 121–22, tbl. 26. In the case of the Santa Cruz Grant, the decision came
even after the Supreme Court’s seemingly contradictory decision in Hayes.
56. See id. at 46–47, 137; John R. Van Ness, Spanish American vs. Anglo American Land
Tenure and the Study of Economic Change in New Mexico, 13 SOC. SCI. J. 45, 48 (1976).
57. See EBRIGHT, supra note 34, at 130.
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rejecting perfect land grants that had complied with such sanctioned
practices, these decisions were arguably contrary to the statute and the laws
of Mexico. These decisions also appear to run counter to the principle of
statutory construction that acts of Congress should be construed to the
extent possible not to violate international law and norms.58
However, rather than criticize these cases as being arguably
contrary to the Treaty, the law of nations, and Congress’s intent in the 1891
statute, the GAO accepts the holdings from cases such as Hayes and
Sandoval, explaining that Congress must have intended to omit any
consideration of equity from the 1891 legislation. Although the GAO
concedes that the implementation of the 1891 legislation resulted in
unfortunate and even inequitable land losses59 it concludes the result was
perfectly legal.60 The GAO ignores the possibility that some decisions
misinterpreted or improperly disregarded the Treaty and Act of 1891, or
that these increasingly technical decisions resulted in sufficient inequities
to cause Congress to reevaluate the propriety of such decisions.61
The language of both the 1854 and 1891 Acts suggests that Congress
intended to confirm New Mexico land grants as Mexico would have,
consistent with international law and the history of the Treaty. If this was
the case, it is within Congress’s purview to correct the Court’s misinterpretation. Certainly such remedial legislation is worth Congress’s
consideration.
D. Federal Remedies
The GAO’s conclusion that the Treaty was not self-executing clearly
merits scrutiny. Given the legal context of the time, Congress may well have
intended the Treaty to be consistent with the customary international legal
principle that lands that would have been valid under Mexico were
required to be recognized to that same extent under the new sovereign.
Contemporary courts recognize that, even where treaty provisions
themselves are not clearly binding, domestic law should be interpreted and
applied to be consistent with legal norms articulated by the treaty.62

58. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (internal quotations
and citations omitted); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
59. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, 9.
60. See id. at 97, 99.
61. The one exception is the case of United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278 (1897), where
the GAO suggests that Congress, if it disagrees with the decision, may want to consider
legislatively overruling this decision. See id. at 161.
62. See Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 947 (Colo. 2002) (stating that “[i]t would be the
height of arrogance and nothing but a legal fiction” to interpret a nineteenth-century land
grant document “without putting it in its historical context,” informed by international law
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This analysis calls into question the holding from Botiller and
suggests, a century later, that Congress may want to consider reviewing and
possibly overruling this decision through affirmative legislation. The GAO
Report fails to critique and analyze not only the Botiller decision, but any
obligations the United States may have based on the intent and spirit of the
Treaty, particularly in light of existing customary international law. Such an
omission should be corrected and brought to light.
II. GRANTS IMPROPERLY COUNTED BY THE
GAO AS “CONFIRMED”
In its discussion of confirmed land grants, the GAO inadequately
addresses the fundamental problem of lands grants not being awarded
correctly, using statistics and drawing conclusions that fail to evaluate the
extent to which erroneously confirmed land grants led to land loss. Further,
based on an incomplete and at times flawed historical and legal analysis,
the GAO erroneously determined that improper confirmations could be
corrected in the courts, and that many of the losses of confirmed grant lands
were due to the acts or omissions of land grantees and heirs themselves.
The GAO identifies as two of the primary long-standing concerns
that prompted its report the facts that (1) many valid community land
grants were denied confirmation, and (2) even where there was
confirmation of valid grants, many were confirmed to the wrong person.63
While the GAO’s stated purpose is to assess these concerns, its assessment
is surprisingly incomplete. Concluding that a substantial number of land
grants were confirmed, and suggesting the federal government largely
succeeded in its obligation under the Treaty, the GAO largely ignores and
fails to provide similar data relating to the large numbers of community
land grants that were confirmed improperly, i.e., not as Mexico would have
done, based on errors in the confirmation process and a failure to apply the
proper legal standards. The GAO also fails to acknowledge the effect of
these wrongful confirmations in causing massive dispossession of land
grant heirs without any legal recourse in the courts, based on muchcriticized Supreme Court decisions that Congress never acted to rectify.
This Part discusses the incomplete and sometimes misleading way in which
the GAO treated this problem of incorrectly confirmed community grants.
A. Historical Context of Community Land Grants

as well as Mexican law and custom).
63. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 8–10.
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In emphasizing the number of community grants that were
confirmed, even if they were confirmed improperly as private grants or
tenancies-in-common, the GAO first seems to overlook the essential quality
of a community land grant which distinguishes it in critical ways from a
private land grant or from a tenancy-in-common landholding pattern. In
general, land grants were either private grants (also called “individual
grants”) or community grants.64 Spanish and Mexican granting documents
did not use the distinguishing terms “community” or “private” grants, so
both types of land grant claims were brought into the confirmation process
without these labels.65 Under Spanish and Mexican land law and legal
custom, the two types of grants differed significantly in terms of ownership
patterns within the boundaries of the grant, use patterns, whether lands
could be sold, and decision making in general.66 In confirming land grants
under the federal process following the Treaty, federal officials were
charged with familiarizing themselves with these Spanish and Mexican
laws and customs.67
A community land grant was a very distinct type of land ownership
pattern in New Mexico from an individual grant. Under Spanish and
Mexican law, community land grants were designed to directly provide the
necessary resources to sustain an entire community.68 The key land
ownership feature for community grants was true common lands, meaning
lands that were not privately owned but were community-owned and freely
used by all grant residents.69 A small portion of the lands within community
grants were private, e.g., house lots and privately-owned irrigated lands,
but those private lands were surrounded by much larger expanses of
common lands, to which all land grant residents had free access and which
were critical to successful small-scale farming and stock-raising activities
64. See EBRIGHT, supra note 34, at 24.
65. See id. at 25.
66. See id. at 24–25.
67. Written instructions from the General Land Office in 1854, just after the Office of the
Surveyor General was established, directed that “[a]mong the ‘necessary acts’ contemplated
by the law and required of you, is, that you shall: (1st) Acquaint yourself with the land system
of Spain as applied to her ultra-marine possessions, the general features of which are
found—modified, of course, by local requirements and usages—in the former provinces and
dependencies of that monarchy on this continent.” GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 193–99. The
instruction further clarified that “[i]t is obligatory on the government of the United States to
deal with the private land titles and the ‘pueblos’ precisely as Mexico would have done had
the sovereignty not changed. We are bound to recognize all titles as she would have done—to
go that far and no further. This is the principle which you will bear in mind in acting upon
these important concerns.” Id.
68. John R. Van Ness, Hispanic Land Grants: Ecology and Subsistence in the Uplands of
Northern New Mexico and Southern Colorado, in LAND, WATER, AND CULTURE: NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON HISPANIC LAND GRANTS 157–61 (Charles L. Briggs & John R. Van Ness eds., 1987).
69. See id.; see also EBRIGHT, supra note 34, at 24–25.
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upon which the local economy was based.70 Land grant boundaries were
deliberately designated so as to encompass the various ecological zones that
would contain the whole array of critical resources.71 The common lands
could not be sold but were to be held in perpetuity by the land grant in its
corporate capacity as a quasi-public entity.72
In contrast, an individual land grant was regarded as private land
in its entirety. Private grants were the private property of the grantee, and
their use, ownership, and marketability were purely private decisions.73 All
decisions regarding the grant, e.g., who could enter and use the grant, or the
sale of any portion of the grant, were the grantees’ decision alone.
Although the GAO Report focuses specifically on community land
grants and the concerns related to the federal confirmation process
established under the Treaty, the GAO did not appear to regard it as a
failure of the confirmation process when community land grants were
awarded to individuals or as tenancies-in-common, or where common lands
were otherwise privatized, despite these critical differences in land tenure.
On the one hand, the GAO acknowledges that grantees’ heirs are concerned
that many community land grants were not confirmed to the “rightful
owners,” meaning that community lands grants were confirmed in ways
that did not preserve the community-owned nature of the common lands.74
However, the GAO then fails to analyze these concerns in any meaningful
way. Such an analysis is critical to an understanding of the failures in the
federal confirmation process.
B. Erroneous Confirmations of Community Grants to Individuals as
Private Grants

70. See id.
71. Researchers have identified the different resources available from the privately held
lands (e.g., irrigated agricultural products) versus those available from the common lands
(e.g., forest products, summer pasture, wild game), and have described how the land grant
residents made use of these different resources at different times over the course of a year. See
Van Ness, supra note 68, at 141–214. See also JOHN VAN NESS, HISPANOS IN NORTHERN NEW
MEXICO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CORPORATE COMMUNITY AND MULTICOMMUNITY (1991).
These studies have concluded that for land grant communities and community members to
survive in the non-cash economies prior to the mid-twentieth century, it was essential that
they have access to the common land resources which interplayed with the resources of their
own private inholdings to produce a complete resource base for successful small-scale family
farming and stock-raising activities. For this reason, a “correct” confirmation of a community
land grant was more than simply the historically valid thing to do, it was critical to the
preservation of the common lands in a form necessary for the communities to survive.
72. See id.
73. See EBRIGHT, supra note 34, at 24.
74. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
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In a number of cases, community land grants were improperly
confirmed as individual grants. This was done when the confirmatory
documents used language assigning ownership of the grant to the heirs,
assigns, and legal representatives of some named individual, rather than to
“the Town of ______.”75 This confirmatory language became the legal basis
for the individual’s claim to the entire grant.76 Typically the individual who
was awarded the grant was the poblador principal, whose name appeared
prominently in the Spanish and Mexican granting documents as the person
petitioning for the grant.77 It was not uncommon that a single person (or a
small number of people) would initiate the petition to the Spanish or
Mexican government for a community grant on behalf of themselves and
a larger number of settlers.78 The grant would be awarded mistakenly to
that individual if the U.S. official reviewing those documents erroneously
overlooked references to the purpose of the grant as one of establishing a
settlement, or references to other settlers joining the poblador principal, or
other evidence of a community grant.79
The most well-known case of this was the Tierra Amarilla Grant.
Published legal histories of this Grant demonstrate that this was a land
grant given for the purposes of founding a settlement, but that confirmation
of the Grant was sought by Francisco Martinez, solely in his name, as an
heir of Manuel Martinez, the poblador principal.80 The granting documents
related that the Grant was given by the Mexican government in 1832 to “the
related petitioners and the rest which may join together” with the directive
that “the pastures, watering places and roads shall be free according to the
custom prevailing in all settlements.”81 Histories such as Ebright’s
demonstrate that the Surveyor General overlooked important features of the
granting documents indicating it should have been regarded as a
community grant. 82 Similarly, in the case of the Juan Bautista Valdez Grant,
the Grant was confirmed to Juan Bautista Valdez despite the fact that nine

75. See H.N.D. Land Co. v. Suazo, 44 N.M. 547, 545–48, 105 P.2d 744, 746–49 (1940)
(describing confirmatory act in the name of Manuel Martinez, rather than to the town or
community of Tierra Amarilla); cf. Reilly v. Shipman, 266 F. 852, 858–59 (8th Cir. 1920)
(upholding the Anton Chico Grant as a community grant in light of the confirmatory
language to the inhabitants of the town of Anton Chico).
76. See, e.g., Reilly v. Shipman, 266 F. 862 (8th Cir. 1920) (language in confirmatory
document is determinative in questions as to in whom title to a land grant is vested).
77. See, e.g., MALCOLM EBRIGHT, THE TIERRA AMARILLA GRANT: A HISTORY OF CHICANERY
(1993) [hereinafter EBRIGHT, THE TIERRA AMARILLA GRANT].
78. Id. at 5.
79. Id. at 34.
80. See, e.g., id. at 14–20.
81. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
82. EBRIGHT, THE TIERRA AMARILLA GRANT, supra note 77, at 14–16.
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other named individuals were put in possession of lots on the Grant as part
of the act of possession by the Spanish granting official.83
The most important consequence of any mistaken confirmation of
a community grant to an individual was the legal conversion of the
common lands of the land grant to ownership by a single individual as
private property. Spain and Mexico never intended that such common
lands be privately held.84 Of course, private ownership meant that the
individual owner could sell the former common lands, something that
would not have been permitted to happen to community grant common
lands under Spain or Mexico.85 Even if it did not happen immediately,
ultimately the lands would pass to an owner who would enforce his or her
private rights by selling the common lands or by excluding or fencing out
the residents who depended on the common lands for their livelihoods.
This is precisely what happened with the Tierra Amarilla Grant,
which was the subject of a long line of legal decisions involving a series of
non-residents, beginning with Thomas B. Catron, who had purchased the
interests of the Francisco Martinez heirs and claimed thereby to own all
594,515 acres of the Grant. Each time the Tierra Amarilla Grant residents
asserted their rights to the common lands the court based its denial on the
U.S. confirmation language which vested ownership of the Grant in
Francisco Martinez.86 Thus, the mistaken confirmation resulted in a radical
and legally enforceable change in ownership of lands that were clearly
intended by Spain and Mexico to be freely open to land grant residents in
perpetuity.
The GAO Report does not provide any real analysis of this problem.
The Report simply recounted the general facts relating to the awarding of
the Tierra Amarilla Grant and the unsuccessful attempts by the heirs to
recover their rights to the common lands.87 Although the Report notes the
concern of grant heirs over confirmations that were not made to the rightful
owners, the Report fails in any way to assess the validity of that concern or
attribute the loss of the Tierra Amarilla Grant common lands to the incorrect
confirmation of the Grant as a private grant.

83. Decision of the Court of Private Land Claims, June 1898, Juan Bautista Valdez Grant,
PLC 179, roll 50, frames 474–76 (on file with the N. M. State Records Ctr. and Archives, Santa
Fe, N.M. (NMSRCA)).
84. See Van Ness, supra note 68, at 157–61; EBRIGHT, supra note 34, at 24–25.
85. EBRIGHT, supra note 34.
86. See Martinez v. Rivera, 196 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1952); Flores v. Bruesselbach, 149 F.2d
616 (10th Cir. 1945); Payne Land & Livestock Co. v. Archuleta, 180 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.M. 1960);
Martinez v. Mundy, 61 N.M. 87, 295 P.2d 209 (N.M. 1956); H.N.D. Land Co. v. Suazo, 44 N.M.
547, 105 P.2d 744 (N.M. 1940).
87. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 105.
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Rather, the GAO attempts to characterize the loss of lands in cases
such as these as a “post-confirmation” problem brought on by grantees
themselves.88 In its general discussion of the concerns over misconfirmations, the GAO concludes—incorrectly—that at least some of those incorrect
misconfirmations could be corrected by present-day court action, and that
the federal government had thereby provided a remedy by which such
misconfirmations could be corrected and the lands finally awarded in the
proper ownership.89 In general, the GAO sidestepps any in-depth
evaluation of the source and scope of this problem.
C. Erroneous Confirmations of Community Grants as Tenancies-inCommon, Which Privatized Otherwise Community-Owned Lands
Another way in which land grant common lands underwent a
radical redefinition in ownership by the U.S. government was when they
were erroneously converted from community-ownership to a type of
private ownership called a tenancy-in-common. Once the common lands
were erroneously privatized in this way, private “shares” or “interests” in
the common lands came into existence and became the object of speculative
activities by non-residents of the grant. This privatization of the common
lands also led in some cases to the loss of the entire common lands through
a type of lawsuit called a partition suit.
Partition suits derive from Anglo-American law, and are filed when
a tract of undivided private land is held jointly by a number of co-owners
and one co-owner wants to “cash out” his or her share of the land, but the
co-owners cannot agree on a buy-out. In this event, the individual can force
the entire parcel of land to be sold at a public auction, and each co-owner
gets his or her proper share of the proceeds of the sale. It is a fairly drastic
measure, because the suit can force the sale of the land out from under all
the remaining co-owners at the instigation of a single co-owner, even if all
the other co-owners want to remain owners of the land and do not want it
to be sold. A common scenario for a partition suit is when a tract of family
land has been passed from the parents to all the siblings, and each sibling
has a fractional share of the undivided piece of land. If one sibling wants to
“cash out”, and if they cannot come to any agreement whereby that sibling
gets bought out by another, the one sibling can force the sale of the land by
filing a partition suit. This type of jointly-owned private land is said to be
a “tenancy-in-common.”90

88.
89.
III.C.
90.

See infra Part IV.B.
The invalidity of this conclusion is further explored later in this article. See infra Part
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1506 (8th ed. 2004).
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The common lands of community land grants should never have
been subject to a partition suit because they were not tenancies-in-common
under Spanish and Mexican law; they were not private lands held by
distinct co-owners. They were lands owned by the land grant itself as a
public corporate body.91 This distinction is critical. Land grant common
lands were analogous to a city-owned park. If there are 100 residents of a
city, there is no right in any resident to assert that he or she “owns” 1
percent of the park, the way a family member might own a share of the
family land. Legally, the city owns it, and the residents only have the right
to use the park. Because city-owned lands are not tenancies-in-common no
one can file a partition suit to have them partitioned. There is only one
owner—the city. Similarly, Spanish and Mexican land grant common lands
were owned by the land grant itself in its corporate capacity. The residents
had the right to use them, but had no ownership over them.92
In New Mexico the fatal act that led to the partitioning of
community land grant common lands occurred when the U.S. government
erroneously created a tenancy-in-common by confirming the grant to a
group of individuals rather than to the community land grant itself. This
did not happen in every instance, but it happened in a significant number
of them.93 Often, the government erroneously awarded the grant to the
original settlers named in the grant documents. In doing so, the government
created a tenancy-in-common that had never existed by dissolving the
community ownership of the grant and completely privatizing the common
lands.94 Certain heirs were now suddenly the private owners of a fractional
share in the common lands. As such, the common lands, or shares of them,
could be sold to non-residents. A single heir or a buyer of an heir’s share of
the co-tenancy could now sue to partition the land grant and force the sale
of what had been the common lands without the consent of the other heirs.
These processes and transactions would have been legally impossible under
the community-ownership pattern created by Spain or Mexico at the
inception of the land grant. In the city-park analogy described above, it was
as if the U.S. government had decreed that all city residents now owned 1

91. See Daniel Tyler, Ejido Lands in New Mexico, J. OF THE WEST, July 1988, at 21, 21–29
[hereinafter Tyler, Ejido Lands].
92. See Van Ness, supra note 68; Daniel Tyler, The Spanish Colonial Legacy and the Role of
Hispanic Custom in Defining New Mexico Land and Water Rights, COLONIAL LATIN AM. HIST.
REV., Spring 1995, at 149, 149–65 [hereinafter Tyler, Spanish Colonial Legacy]; See also Tyler,
Ejido Lands, supra note 91.
93. See infra Part II.E, at Table 1.
94. Up to that point the only private lands within the grant would have been each
resident’s own irrigated lands and house lot. Conversion of a community grant to a tenancyin-common did not change the status of those private lands, but privatized the remainder of
the grant by giving a fractional share to each named grantee.
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percent of the park and could do with their 1 percent whatever they
wanted, including filing a partition suit and forcing the sale of the park to
the highest bidder.
1. Tenancies-in-Common: A Federal Invention for Community Land Grants
No community land grant ever should have been confirmed or
patented as a tenancy-in-common, as there was no support in prior law or
customary practice for the notion that such common lands were tenanciesin-common under Spain or Mexico. The confirmation of community grants
as tenancies-in-common was a monumental error on the part of the U.S.
confirmation process which led to disastrous consequences for land grant
heirs in nearly every case in which it occurred. That the GAO failed to
recognize this in any meaningful way is an omission that must be clarified
in considering possible remedies for the loss of land grants in New Mexico.
The fact that community land grant common lands were truly
communal lands, and were not held as private fractional shares, was an
elemental aspect of Spanish and Mexican property law at the time of the
change in sovereignty.95 In many cases, the Spanish and Mexican granting
documents themselves contained language that made it manifestly clear
that the common lands were not private lands, and these documents were
always closely reviewed by the relevant U.S. officials. Federal personnel
delved into much more arcane nuances of Spanish and Mexican land grant
law, albeit not always correctly, such as exactly who could authorize a land
grant, the legal maximum size a land grant could be, or how long the
grantees had to reside on the grant before it vested. The fact that land grants
were originally granted either as private grants or as community
grants—but virtually never as tenancies-in-common—was basic by
comparison.96 Given this and the fact that the Surveyor General was

95. Tyler, Ejido Lands, supra note 91, at 2; Tyler, Spanish Colonial Legacy, supra note 92.
96. Spanish and Mexican granting documents did not use the distinguishing terms
“community” or “private” grants to differentiate grants that had true common lands from
purely privately-held grants. However, there were often clear indications in the granting
documents as to the community nature of a particular land grant, which would have
indicated that these grants were not tenancies-in-common under Spanish and Mexican law.
For example, the GAO considered a land grant to be a community grant if any one of the
following three criteria were met in the original grant documents: (1) the grant documents
declared part of the grant to be for communal use, using such terms as “common lands” or
“pasturage and water in common”; (2) the grant was made for the purpose of establishing a
new town or settlement; or (3) the grant was issued to 10 or more settlers. U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFINITION AND LIST OF COMMUNITY LAND GRANTS IN NEW MEXICO 13
(2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01951.pdf. Had federal officials used
even these simple criteria to designate “original document” community grants, and been
consistent in ruling out a tenancy-in-common land tenure for those grants, many land grants
would have been spared the problems and losses that accompanied confirmation as a
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specifically mandated to settle land claims “precisely as Mexico would have
done had the sovereignty not changed,” it is hard to understand this
wholesale misconstruction of the basic land-tenure pattern under Spain and
Mexico. 97
Yet of the 131 non-Pueblo community lands grants identified by the
GAO, U.S. decision makers awarded fewer of them as true community land
grants (20) than as tenancies-in-common (27)—an astounding statistic when
one considers that tenancies-in-common were a land-tenure pattern not
used by Spain or Mexico for community grants. Each of these tenancies-incommon recast the common lands as a set of fractional, highly-marketable
private shares—a far conceptual cry from the Spanish and Mexican idea of
common lands as an intact and inalienable pool of publicly-owned
resources.
Why this happened is certainly an issue that would benefit from
further research. In some cases, it is clear that land speculators with
connections to decision makers in Washington influenced the outcome so
that certain community land grants were confirmed as tenancies-incommon despite the residents’ wishes to the contrary. An example of this
is discussed in Part II.C.3, below, in the case of the Mora Grant. The obvious
motivation for a land speculator would have been that the speculator
understood that a tenancy-in-common would have afforded several types
of opportunities to detach the former common lands from the community
and release them into the market. All the speculator had to do was acquire
a share of the tenancy-in-common from any heir and force a partition suit,
and he could make a profit on his acquired share or put in a speculative bid
on the entire common lands.98 Or, if the speculator were a lawyer, which

tenancy-in-common.
97. See supra note 67.
98. David Correia, Land Grant Speculation in New Mexico During the Territorial
Period—Appendix to Righting the Record: A Response to the GAO’s 2004 Report Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 927 (2008) [hereinafter Correia, Land Grant Speculation].
In the case of the Mora Land Grant, a partition suit was filed by Stephen B. Elkins, a non-resident
land speculator, and Vicente Romero, a resident, both of whom had bought a number of
fractional interests in the Grant. See, case study on Mora Grant infra Part II.C.3. Elkins, an
attorney, had also acquired an interest in the Grant as payment for representing a Grant
resident in a criminal case. The partition suit for the Domingo Fernandez (a/k/a San
Cristobal, a/k/a Eaton) Grant was filed by non-resident Thomas B. Catron after he acquired
an interest by purchase. The Santa Barbara Grant was represented by attorney Napolean
Bonaparte Laughlin before the CPLC, for which he received a fee of an undivided one-third
of the Grant. The Grant was confirmed as a tenancy-in-common, which made Laughlin a onethird co-owner of the common lands, and therefore a potential initiator of a partition suit.
Three years after confirmation and receiving his fee, he sued for partition, and the entire
common lands of his former clients were sold. Laughlin himself was the high bidder at the
auction, so he bought the Grant and reportedly sold it five years later at more than 400
percent profit. Obviously it was a serious ethical violation for an attorney to take land as
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was not uncommon, he could facilitate the process without having to make
an initial purchase by encouraging a grantee to file a partition suit and by
representing him or her in that suit.99 In contrast, a community land grant
confirmed with intact, community-owned common lands would not have
been subject to partitioning and would not have provided these types of
speculative opportunities.100
That still begs the question, however, as to why federal officials
would have entertained the proposition that common lands could be held
as tenancies-in-common, especially given the absence of either Spanish or
Mexican law or customary practice recognizing this type of land tenure

payment and then file a suit that resulted in the sale of his clients’ land out from under them.
Yet this occurred in a number of cases. See David Benavides, Lawyer-Induced Partitioning of
New Mexico Land Grants: An Ethical Travesty (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the University of New Mexico School of Law Library). All three of these grants were
considered “original documentation” community grants by the GAO, but were confirmed as
tenancies-in-common.
99. Attorney Alonzo B. McMillen represented the Petitioner in the suit to partition the
Town of Las Trampas Land Grant. McMillen’s law partner was the sole bidder at the auction.
The court, however, determined that this setup was fraudulent and ordered a new sale. At the
time the Alameda Grant was partitioned and ordered sold, McMillen, who again represented
the party petitioning for partition, was found to be the owner of just under one-half of the
common lands of the Grant, which he had received “for legal services rendered and by
purchase.” Montoya v. Heirs, 16 N.M. 349, 358, 120 P. 676, 678 (1911). Thus, through the
partition suit McMillen hoped to receive just under half of the proceeds of the sale. (In that
case, however, the court decided there were no common lands to partition, so there was no
sale.) McMillen also represented the Petitioners in the suit to partition the Cañon de San Diego
Grant. This time McMillen, as the only bidder at the auction, did purchase the Grant and the
purchase was not set aside. G. TAYLOR, NOTES ON COMMUNITY-OWNED LAND GRANTS IN NEW
MEXICO 8 (1937). These three grants were considered community grants by the GAO, with the
Las Trampas Grant and the Cañon de San Diego Grant being “original document” community
grants.
100. The partitioning of the Town of Tome Grant was halted when the Grantees
attempting to sue for partition were held to have no interest in the common lands because all
legal title in the common lands was vested in the incorporated town. See Bond v. Unknown
Heirs of Barela, 16 N.M. 660, 120 P. 707 (1911) aff’d, 229 U.S. 488 (1913). This same description
of community-ownership of the common lands—and the absence of private ownership in the
common lands—was determined for the Town of Atrisco Grant in Armijo v. Town of Atrisco,
56 N.M. 2, 239 P.2d 535 (1951), the Town of Chilili Grant, in Shearton Dev. Co. v. Town of Chilili
Land Grant, 2003-NMCA-120, 134 N.M. 444, 78 P.3d 525, the Town of Belen and Town of Casa
Colorado grants in Yeast v. Pru, 292 F. 598 (D.N.M. 1923) and the Anton Chico Grant in Reilly
v. Shipman, 266 F. 862 (8th Cir. 1920). See also Cubero v. DeSoto, 76 N.M. 490, 491, 416 P.2d 155
(1966). These were all cases of grants confirmed as community land grants and not as
tenancies-in-common. None of these grants was successfully partitioned. Proper confirmation
of a community land grant, therefore, tended to be a shield against partitioning. The only
instance of a partitioning of a community land grant confirmed as such is the partial
partitioning of the Cebolleta Land Grant, in which the common lands were not sold as a block
by the court, but large tracts were awarded to private non-resident individuals and attorneys,
leaving the Grant itself with only about 16 percent of its former common lands.
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among land grants. The GAO suggests that because of the quitclaim
language in the confirmatory acts and in patents, it was of little consequence
if federal officials got the ownership wrong. According to the GAO, the true
owners could have their day in state court after the federal confirmation
process and ultimately have the grant awarded to the proper owners or in
the proper land-tenure pattern.101 If this explanation were true, it would
mean, in effect, that the federal government felt it was discharging its treaty
obligation even if it was negligent in awarding land grants and even if the
rightful owners were thereby forced to initiate a completely different court
process to get back the grant from the individual to whom the federal
government had improperly awarded the grant.
It does not appear, however, that the federal government actually
relied on the existence of state court corrective action to make up for any
lack of federal rigor in applying Spanish and Mexican law. If it had, the
federal government would have made dramatic changes in the wake of the
Tameling decision to conform its subsequent confirmations more closely to
Mexican law. As discussed in Part III of this report, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 1876 decision in Tameling made it clear that the courts had no
jurisdiction to review an allegedly incorrect land grant confirmation by
Congress. Contrary to the GAO’s theory, however, there is no record of this
ruling resulting in a systematic review of federal recommendations to look
for possible mistakes (to avoid those mistakes being set in stone once
Congress acted), nor was there a halt to the confirmation of community
lands as tenancies-in-common.
In fact, the federal government often took less interest in correctly
determining the nature of a grant’s land tenure than in correctly
determining other aspects of the grant. The case of the San Joaquin de
Nacimiento Grant illustrates this pattern.102 The Grant was submitted to
Surveyor General T. Rush Spencer in 1871. Spencer found the Grant to be
valid and drafted a decision approving the Grant. He died before the
decision was formally issued. His successor as Surveyor General, James K.
Proudfit, issued the formal decision approving the grant in 1872, and
submitted it to Congress. The decision confirmed the Grant, incorrectly, as
a tenancy-in-common, to “the thirty-six original grantees and their heirs and
legal representatives.”103 The Grant was surveyed in 1879 for 131,725
acres.104

101. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 66, 107, 132.
102. This Grant is centered around present-day Cuba, N.M.
103. The Spanish granting documents made clear that the Grant was for the purpose of
establishing a settlement, and that the Grant was being made to 36 heads of family. The GAO
considered this Grant as an “original document” community grant. See supra note 96.
104. J.J. Bowden, Private Land Claims in the Southwest 1384 (1969) (Master’s thesis,
Southern Methodist Univ.) (on file with the University of New Mexico School of Law Library).

Fall 2008]

THE GAO’S 2004 REPORT

881

Tension arose on the Grant because of the presence there of settlers
who had no connection with the original 1769 settlement, some of whom
had recently been given small holding claim permits by the General Land
Office.105 At the same time, the Grant had seen a steady influx of
descendants of the original settlers re-occupying the grant as conditions
became safer for permanent occupation in the outlying areas of the
territory.106 Had the Grant been understood to be a community grant, it is
possible that the community could have accommodated new settlers,
provided them with unallotted lands or unoccupied lands that were not resettled, and integrated them into the Grant. This happened on a number of
grants.107 But the combination of the tenancy-in-common designation, in
which only descendants of the original grantees had rights to the land, and
the unlawful yet federally issued small-holding claim permits for some of
the same land, created what seemed to be irreconcilable claims. Here was
a perfect opportunity for the federal government to properly recognize the
Grant as a community grant, undo the tenancy-in-common designation,
affirm the common lands as a public resource and perhaps resolve a locallycontentious issue that it helped create in the first place.
Surveyor General Julian and his staff conducted significant field
research in an 1886 re-examination of the claim, but his decision
compounded the errors of his predecessors by reversing their approval of
the Grant and holding that it was invalid “by reasons of non-compliance
with the conditions prescribed.”108 Not only were the three reasons given
fairly technical ones (non-compliance with the four-year residency
requirement; that the town itself did not conform to the design or size as set
forth in the Spanish granting papers; and that “[t]he names of the present
claimants of the land are not given and there is no proof that they are the
heirs and legal representatives of the grantees”), but the second reason was
not a valid reason for denying a land grant, and the first one was not

105. The 1854 Surveyor General Act sought to prevent the unnecessary creation of
competing claimants for the same lands by making claimed land grant lands off limits to
distribution by the General Land Office (GLO) under homestead and similar laws. The GLO
reported in 1885, however, that its employees had routinely disregarded that prohibition
during this time period, which created unnecessary internal problems for many land grants.
Letter from the Secretary of the Interior Transmitting Copies of Reports upon the Subject of Fraudulent
Acquisition of Titles to Lands in New Mexico, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 106, 48th Congress, 2nd Sess.
(1885) (statement of Henry M. Teller, Sec’y of the Dep’t of the Interior of the United States).
106. See HILARIO LUNA, SAN JOAQUIN DE NACIMIENTO (1975) at 43–68, 151 (on file with
authors).
107. See infra Part II.C.3: Case Study: The Town of Mora Grant.
108. LUNA, supra note 106, at 137 (citing Surveyor General Julian’s 1886 supplemental
report).
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supported by the evidence.109 But it is Julian’s third point that was collateral
to the issue of the Grant’s validity. If the Grant had been correctly
confirmed to the Town of San Joaquin del Nacimiento, or the inhabitants of
San Joaquin de Nacimiento, as other correctly-identified community grants
had been, rather than as a tenancy-in-common to “the thirty-six original
grantees and their heirs and legal representatives,” the question of who was
descended from the original grantees would have been moot.110 But since
Julian’s investigation focused more effort on finding technicalities for
invalidating the Grant than on determining the proper ownership pattern
under Spanish law, this solution was never reached. Instead, Julian’s
decision, had it been adopted by Congress, would have meant that the
entire land grant would have been U.S. public domain.111
In this and other cases, U.S. officials showed themselves quite
capable of delving into the minutiae of Spanish and Mexican land law, but
it appears they did so selectively. In the Nacimiento case, one sees a very
rigorous analysis, albeit incorrect, regarding the validity of the Grant. The
same attention was not consistently given to the land-tenure question,
which could have ensured greater conformity with the communityownership patterns established under Spanish and Mexican law. Having
earlier determined a tenancy-in-common where one had never existed,
federal officials found “problems” regarding the validity of the Grant, some
of which in fact were problems arising only as a consequence of the
tenancy-in-common designation. These “problems,” as well as conflicts on
the ground, all could have been resolved by simply abandoning the
tenancy-in-common notion. But the land-tenure question did not seem to
carry the same importance to federal decision makers, although it was
critically important in terms of the ultimate fate of the Grant itself.

109. Julian based his finding of non-compliance with the four-year residency rule “most
probably on account of the hostility of the Indians.” Id. at 136 (citing Surveyor General Julian’s
1886 supplemental report). None of the affidavits upon which Julian relied related to the fouryear period after the Grant was made (1769–72). The affiants only could attest to the condition
of settlement of the Grant in the 1800s, when it appears there were alternating periods of
abandonment and resettlement of the Grant. On the other hand, multiple births and marriages
were recorded in archdiocese records for the period 1769–86 among residents identified as
being from San Joaquin del Nacimiento; many of the original Grantees named in the Spanish
granting documents are named in these records. Thus records existed that supported the
settlers’ compliance with the four-year residency requirement. Julian, without any evidence
to the contrary, simply chose to believe otherwise.
110. Id. at 118–19 (citing Surveyor General Proudfit’s 1872 report recommending approval
of the Grant.).
111. That was the ultimate fate of the Grant, even though Congress did not act on any of
the Surveyor General recommendations. The CPLC rejected the Grant on the basis of lack of
the authority of the re-granting Spanish official. See infra Part V: Rejected Claims and Acreage.
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2. Consequences
Because tenancies-in-common and partition sales were completely
foreign to the Spanish and Mexican way of regarding community land
grants, it was rare that the Mexican claimants understood the legal
ramifications of the precise wording of the confirmation enough to timely
challenge the determination of the Surveyor General.112 Certainly it is
difficult to imagine land grant residents, operating in a land-based,
subsistence economy, and dependent on free access to the common lands
for their livelihoods, knowingly consenting to a land-tenure pattern that
allowed the possibility of 90-some percent of their land base being sold out
from under them in a partition suit. It is probable that in most cases land
grant residents only understood that their grant had been “confirmed” or
“patented,” and would have assumed that such confirmation had
maintained the common lands in the same land tenure as had existed prior
to U.S. sovereignty, which indeed was what the federal government was
obligated to do.
If the land grant was converted to a tenancy-in-common, a person’s
rights as a land grant resident suddenly depended on which names were
found in the original Spanish and Mexican granting documents and
whether that person was descended from one of those original grantee
names. Under Spain and Mexico, it was residency on the grant that gave
people their rights of access to the common lands, and all residents were
roughly equal to one another in terms of that access, whether they were new
residents or long-time residents.113 For this reason Spanish and Mexican
officials did not always find it necessary to set down a precise or complete
list of the original grantees. U.S. decision makers, however, once they
decided to give the grant to identifiable people rather than to a community,
took some or all of the named grantees found in the grant documents and

112. The Mora Grant and the Anton Chico Grant are two exceptional instances in which
land grant residents clearly were aware of and opposed a tenancy-in-common designation
and focused the General Land Office’s attention on that issue. Notwithstanding this, however,
the patents to both grants were issued as tenancies-in-common by federal officials. See infra
Part II.C.3: Case Study: The Town of Mora Grant; Michael J. Rock, Anton Chico and its Patent,
in SPANISH AND MEXICAN LAND GRANTS IN NEW MEXICO AND COLORADO 86 (John R. &
Christine M. Van Ness eds., 1980). In the case of the Anton Chico Grant, there was a blatant
conflict of interest in that the Surveyor General chose to deliver the patent to the New Mexico
Land and Livestock Company, of which he was the president, rather than to the community.
The community-ownership of the Anton Chico Grant was ultimately salvaged by a settlement
that cost the Grant 135,000 acres of land, and by a 1920 federal court ruling that the
confirmation language, which ran to the community, prevailed over the language of the
patent, which ran to the assigns of the original settlers. Id.; see also Reilly v. Shipman, 266 F.
862 (8th Cir. 1920).
113. Tyler, Ejido Lands, supra note 91, at 26.
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conferred on them the status as the only legal owners of the grant.114 Some
granting documents listed only one or two names, and for that reason an
entire community grant would sometimes be awarded only to those
individuals, even if it was clear from the documents that they were being
accompanied by other unnamed people.115 Unnamed grantees and residents
who had taken up residency after the grant was made were deemed to have
no ownership interest, while named grantees were deemed to have a full
ownership interest even if they no longer resided on the grant.116
This bizarre two-class division of people into grant owners and
non-owners—artificially created by chance and the vagaries of the granting
documents to satisfy an erroneous tenancy-in-common designation—was
in marked contrast to those grants that were correctly confirmed as true
community grants with common lands. As was noted in the San Joaquin de
Nacimiento case, this division created unnecessary tensions among
residents who were not descended from the original grantees and who
correctly surmised that their status on the grant was threatened.
This division was magnified by the United States making the
original grantees and their heirs actual owners of the common lands, thus
elevating the named co-tenants from co-equal users of the common lands to
persons with the power to do what no resident of a true community grant
could do, i.e., unilaterally sell or otherwise dispose of a share of the
common lands. In contrast, the unnamed grantees and the later-established
residents were rendered completely without input as to the fate of the
common lands as legal control passed from the community to the
designated tenants-in-common. If the grant was sold or partitioned, it was
done against their wishes and with little or no remuneration.117
Furthermore, tenancy-in-common and private-grant designation
served as a legal prerequisite that attracted significant outside economic
pressures directed at establishing ownership of the former common lands
entirely in non-resident owners. To the outside world, particularly those in
the land business, a tenancy-in-common was an infinitely more marketable
commodity than a community grant, both because the common lands were
private and freely marketable, and because it distilled the larger population
of the grant to a more limited list of co-owners who possessed the
marketable shares of the grant. Share-purchasing from newly-created

114. See Correia, Land Grant Speculation, supra note 98. (regarding the Surveyor General
decision as to whether to award the Petaca Grant to three, rather than to nine, named
Grantees).
115. Id.
116. See id. at 19.
117. It should be noted that, with partitioning in particular, most of the designated
tenants-in-common usually also opposed partitioning in spite of being entitled to proceeds
from the sale. See EBRIGHT, supra note 34, at 155–56.
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tenants-in-common in New Mexico became literally an international activity
in which some of the world’s wealthiest people participated.118 A number
of share-purchasing strategies could lead to ownership of the entire grant,
including a strategy of forcing a partition sale.119 Most of these strategies
depended on a tenancy-in-common designation because they required the
existence of a pool of land grant residents possessing marketable shares of
the grant.120 Since no resident of a community land grant had any share of
common lands to sell, this type of speculation focused on grants confirmed
as tenancies-in-common and as private grants.
Occasionally things would happen in reverse order, but for the
same reason, i.e., a buyer would make a speculative quitclaim purchase
from a grant resident who was a named grantee prior to confirmation (i.e.,
prior to the seller even having any legally recognized share of the grant)
and then lobby strenuously for confirmation as a tenancy-in-common or as
a private grant, as opposed to a community grant, so that the purchase
would not be worthless.121 In this way, the fact that a tenancy-in-common
was even an acceptable option in the adjudication of community land grants
brought not only outside economic forces into play, but also outside
pressure to bear on federal officials to erroneously validate it as a landtenure pattern.122

118. See Correia, Land Grant Speculation, supra note 98; MARÍA E. MONTOYA, TRANSLATING
PROPERTY: THE MAXWELL LAND GRANT AND THE CONFLICT OVER LAND IN THE AMERICAN WEST,
1840–1900 (2002).
119. Correia, Land Grant Speculation, supra note 98, shows two strategies that were used.
The first, which was more labor intensive, involved attempting to acquire every interest from
every designated tenant-in-common and then claiming the entire grant. The second involved
acquiring at least one share from one tenant-in-common, partnering with a potential buyer,
and suing for partition and having the buyer bid to acquire the entire grant at the partition
sale. An example of a premeditated partition strategy was set forth in a provision of a
business contract between two individuals, L. Bradford Prince and Alonzo McMillen, who
were for many years actively involved in the acquisition and sale of New Mexico land grants.
The provision read, “[they] have associated themselves, and do hereby associate themselves
together for the purpose of acquiring title to the Sebastian Martin Land Grant…and to take
the steps necessary to bring to a public sale of said real estate.” MARGARET COYNE, ESTACA IN
HISTORY 18–19 (1997) (alteration in the original).
120. E.g., Thomas B. Catron stated that initially his land grant acquisition strategy focused
on confirmed grants where his attention could be focused on identifiable individuals in whom
confirmation was vested. VICTOR WESTPHALL, MERCEDES REALES: HISPANIC LAND GRANTS OF
THE UPPER RIO GRANDE REGION 221(1983).
121. Correia, Land Grant Speculation, supra note 98.
122. People who bought what they believed to be a tenancy-in-common share would
sometimes not even wait for confirmation before extracting resources from the grant. Correia,
Land Grant Speculation, supra note 98, (extensive extraction of timber and minerals and
extensive grazing use on Petaca Grant by buyer of supposed shares of tenancy-in-common in
years leading up to decisions by CPLC and the New Mexico Supreme Court that grant was
not a tenancy-in-common).
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In some cases these transactions took years to develop and manifest
into any kind of tangible denial of access to the common lands, and in the
meantime, the residents continued to occupy and use the land collectively
as before, under the assumption that the common lands remained in
community ownership. For example, the Cañon de San Diego Grant was a
community land grant erroneously confirmed in 1860 as a tenancy-incommon. It was partitioned and auctioned off in 1907 or 1908. After 1908,
the residents were suddenly assessed fees by the new owner for grazing
and firewood gathering on the former common lands, which had previously
been free to all residents.123
By that point in time, it was too late to undo the tenancy-incommon designation. After 1876, the U.S. Supreme Court had made it clear
through the Tameling decision that the courts would not revisit a
congressional confirmation of a grant, no matter how erroneous it may have
been.124 Partition suits were also notorious for passing under the community
radar, and many partition suits were announced only by publication in
English-language newspapers.125 In any event, in a non-cash economy, land
grant residents were in no position to buy out the interest of the person
seeking partition, much less put in a high bid at the partition auction. The
common lands that were sold usually comprised the vast majority—often
95 percent or more—of the land base of the grant.126 Without them, the
subsistence farming and ranching economy of the land grant became
unviable. The conversion of the common lands to a tenancy-in-common set
events on a course that most communities were virtually powerless to
reverse, even if they had been aware of the legal landscape.
3. Case Study: The Town of Mora Grant
In 1875 and 1876, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior
and the Commissioner of the General Land Office in Washington, D.C., had
a decision to make in which, it seemed, many people in New Mexico were
very interested: Should the patent to the Town of Mora Land Grant be
issued to the “Town of Mora” or to the “76 original settlers of the grant,
their heirs and assigns”?127
The former designation would have tended to establish the Grant
as a community land grant in the historical land-tenure pattern (i.e., areas
of settlement surrounded by common lands), whereas the latter designation

123. TAYLOR, supra note 99.
124. See infra Part III.
125. See EBRIGHT, supra note 34, at 152.
126. See, e.g., id. at 151–53; TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 6–8.
127. Robert D. Shadow & Maria Rodriguez-Shadow, From Repartición to Partition: The
Life and History of the Mora Land Grant, 1835–1916, at 32 (Apr. 1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
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would have created a tenancy-in-common that had not heretofore existed
on the Grant. In their formal petition to the Surveyor General, the
Petitioners for the Grant had not asked for it to be awarded to only the 76
original settlers but rather to “themselves and the other inhabitants, settlers
of the valley of Mora.”128 By this time, the inhabitants of the Mora Land
Grant included many families in addition to the 76 original families and
they were spread among a number of newer communities in addition to the
original communities of Mora (Santa Gertrudis) and San Antonio (now
Cleveland). In their exhaustive study of the Mora Land Grant, Robert D.
Shadow and Maria Rodriguez-Shadow concluded that “[t]he fact that [the
patent] was finally issued in the latter format is due largely to the work and
influence of Congressman Stephen B. Elkins.”129
What possessed Elkins, New Mexico’s first elected delegate to
Congress, to influence the Department of the Interior to, in effect,
mischaracterize the land ownership of the Mora Land Grant?130 The short
answer, according to Shadow and Shadow, is personal gain.131 Elkins, along
with the notorious land speculator Thomas B. Catron, had previously
sought out willing sellers from among the original 76 settlers (or their
descendants), some of whom no longer lived on the grant. These
individuals then purchased a number of fractional interests in the Mora
Land Grant.132 These “interests,” however, legally hinged on the form of
issuance of the patent, a decision that had not yet been made. Elkins and
Catron were banking on the patent creating a tenancy-in-common. A
tenancy-in-common would mean that each of the 76 settlers owned a
fractional share of the common lands and actually had something valuable
to sell. The share of just one of the original 76 settlers would have been 1/76
of the 827,621-acre grant, or 10,890 acres. On the other hand, designation as
a community grant would have meant community ownership of the
common lands. In that case, no descendant would have had any ownership
interest in the common lands to sell. The interests the descendants had
quitclaimed to Elkins and Catron would have been virtually worthless.
Elkins, therefore, had no small vested interest in altering the historic landtenure pattern to that of a tenancy-in-common. By the time he permanently
moved to Washington, D.C., in 1873 as New Mexico’s Congressional
Delegate, he was in a unique position to influence the upcoming decision.133

128. Id. at 31.
129. Id. at 32.
130. The Mora Grant qualified as an “original document” community grant under any of
the criteria used by the GAO. See supra text accompanying note 98.
131. Shadow & Rodriguez-Shadow, supra note 127, at 31–37.
132. Id. at 33.
133. See Clark S. Knowlton, The Mora Land Grant: A New Mexican Tragedy, in SPANISH AND
MEXICAN LAND GRANTS AND THE LAW 59, 64–65 (Malcolm Ebright ed., 1989).
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Land Grant residents caught wind of Elkins’ efforts and protested, realizing
that privatization of the Grant would mean the potential loss of free access
to the common lands upon which all residents relied to some extent for their
livelihood.134 Since the Grant’s inception in 1835, the number of residents
had swelled to about 10,000 by 1875, a great many of whom had migrated
there after 1835 and could not claim ancestry from the original 76 settlers.135
In 1875, 1,073 Hispano residents of the Grant signed a petition which was
forwarded to the General Land Office.136 The petition pointed out, among
other things, the absurdity of giving exclusive property rights to persons
named on a granting document, some of whom abandoned the grant
without ever residing on it, at the expense of those actually living on and
using the grant. The petition also made clear the terms under which it was
understood by everyone on the Grant that new families could settle it after
1835, i.e., with full rights to use the common lands equal to the original
grantees.137 Many of these new families were in fact invited under these
terms to settle the Grant by the original families, who saw greater numbers
as affording greater protection against raids by nomadic tribes. A group of
Anglo-American residents of the Grant sent a similar letter to the
Department of the Interior, making the same points and objections as the
Hispano residents’ petition.138
In this case, unlike most others, the Grant residents themselves
were alert to what was going on and properly focused the attention of
federal officials on the question of community grant versus tenancy-incommon. There was certainly sufficient on-the-ground information upon
which to base a sound decision. Those officials, however, chose to disregard
the fact that even the claimants who petitioned the Surveyor General and
were descended from the original 76 settlers sought confirmation of the
Grant as a true community grant and not as a tenancy-in-common. The
patent was issued by the General Land Office on August 15, 1876, to “the
76 original settlers of the grant, their heirs and assigns,” i.e., as a tenancy-incommon. Elkins and Catron had prevailed.139

134. Id.
135. See id. at 66–67.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Shadow and Rodriguez-Shadow’s research shows that the subsequent partition suit
filed by Elkins and Vicente Romero took an unusual turn which diminished the financial
returns that were gained by the various land speculators, although nothing could be done to
re-establish the common lands as community-held property. The state district court handling
the partition suit allowed Grant residents and other long-time squatters on the Grant to make
exaggerated claims of private inholdings within the grant. Since private inholdings were not
part of the tenancy-in-common they were shielded from the partition sale. The size of the
common lands was dramatically decreased by permitting these large private inholdings,
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This case shows that the conversion of community land grants to
tenancies-in-common was sometimes the result of deliberate lobbying by
people with vested interests. Federal officials, charged with adjudicating
land grant claims “precisely as Mexico would have done had the
sovereignty not changed,” neglected that duty in some instances and were
instead influenced to designate a land tenure that had not previously
existed on the Grant.140
D. The GAO Counted as Confirmed Even Those Grants Whose
Confirmation, Under United States v. Sandoval, Was Fundamentally
Erroneous and Whose Acreage Was Vastly Reduced
In United States v. Sandoval, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
common lands were owned by the sovereign, not the community, and
passed to the United States at the change in sovereignty.141 In a landmark
decision that eviscerated the character of all community land grants
adjudicated from that point on, the Court limited the San Miguel del Bado
Grant to the land encompassed by individual allotments rather than any of
the common lands, holding that it was up to Congress whether to convey
the otherwise “equitable” title to the common lands.142 This ruling reduced
the San Miguel del Bado Grant award by 98.4 percent: from 315,300 acres,
as decided by the CPLC (combined total of individual allotments and
common lands), to 5,024 acres (individual allotments only).
While the GAO acknowledges the significant loss of common lands
in the six land grant decisions following Sandoval, and the fact that the
decision has been criticized for its legal and historical accuracy, the GAO
fails to analyze or even discuss such criticism.143 Rather, the GAO describes
the lands lost under Sandoval as simply an “equitable” issue and the nature
of the common lands as outside the jurisdiction of the courts under the Act
of 1891:
As our analysis explains, however, the [Supreme] Court had
no authority under the 1891 Act to confirm grants based on the
type of equitable rights involved in the Sandoval land grant
claim and related cases; it could confirm only those grants

meaning there was much less acreage to sell in the partition sale, and presumably a lower sale
price and less profit for those having shares of the common lands. Although this strategy
gained extra private land for some grant residents, the entire Grant was privatized in one way
or another by this process, as with any tenancy-in-common, and the common lands effectively
destroyed as such. Shadow & Rodriguez-Shadow, supra note 127, at 33–40.
140. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, app. IX, at 198. See supra text accompanying note 67.
141. United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278, 295–98 (1897).
142. See id. at 298.
143. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 115–17 & nn.96–97.
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“lawfully and regularly derived” under Spanish or Mexican
law.144
The GAO’s analysis appears to miss the mark in two ways, the first
having to do with the GAO’s characterization that only equitable rights
were involved in the case. Certainly there is a widespread sense of inequity
in so dramatically altering the nature and size of community grants that
came up for confirmation on the heels of Sandoval, compared to those that
came before and kept their common lands intact. Additionally, severing the
common lands from the community—thereby undermining fundamentally
the local economy and the livelihoods of community members—seems
obviously contrary to the Treaty’s basic property guarantees.
However, from a strictly legal perspective, a significant body of
post-Sandoval scholarship has concluded that those communities possessed
legal rights to ownership of the common lands—as opposed to merely
equitable rights—under the very Spanish and Mexican law upon which the
Court professed to rely.145 These studies explore the Court’s strained
interpretation of a very limited supply of English-language texts on Spanish
and Mexican land law and suggest that, had the Court been able to form a
more accurate understanding of how Spain and Mexico would have
regarded the legal rights to the common lands, it would not have
characterized the community rights to the common lands as merely
equitable.146
Nowhere does the GAO describe the role of the U.S. Attorney as a
formidable force in advancing this legal theory to both the CPLC and the
Supreme Court, nor whether this role was legitimate insofar as protecting
the United States from fraudulent land claims. Rather than suggest that the
Sandoval decision may have misinterpreted Spanish and Mexican law or
provide an historical analysis of what might have caused the Court to do so,
the GAO simply restates and accepts for purposes of its analysis the notion
that the Sandoval case concerned purely equitable rather than legal rights.147
The other major flaw in the GAO’s analysis is its premise that the
Supreme Court had “no authority under the 1891 Act” to rule in favor of
community ownership of the common lands.148 Even if the Court, arguendo,
correctly applied Spanish and Mexican law, the GAO failed to analyze
whether the Court nonetheless misinterpreted the Act of 1891 by construing
the Act to omit any consideration of equity, as discussed in Part I above. In
other words, even given its flawed interpretation of the lack of legal

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
See EBRIGHT, supra note 34, at 105–23; Tyler, Ejido Lands, supra note 91, at 26.
See EBRIGHT, supra note 34, at 105–23.
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 163.
Id.
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entitlement to the common lands, the Court could have awarded the
common lands on equitable grounds. Here, the GAO simply repeats the
Sandoval Court’s own constricted, and likely flawed, characterization of its
authority at the time without any analysis whatsoever.
Certainly both issues are relevant to Congress’s consideration of
any redress for these seven grants and the 1.1 million acres of common
lands lost as a direct result of the Sandoval decision. While the GAO cites
Sandoval as an example of a court ruling that Congress may want to “legislatively overrule,” the fact that the GAO offers no substantive critique of the
case and its much-contested interpretation of Spanish and Mexican law as
well as the 1891 legislation, is itself a significant omission in its report.149
E. Arguably the Vast Majority of Community Land Grants Were Not
Confirmed as They Would Have Been Under Mexico
Despite the significant numbers of cases in which improper
confirmation led directly to the loss of land grants, the GAO failed to
incorporate the issues surrounding these erroneous confirmations into its
conclusions or statistical analysis. When discussing confirmed community
grants, the GAO simply gave a figure for the number of community grants
that were “confirmed” without analyzing those grants to determine which
of them were confirmed correctly or incorrectly.150 This was a surprising
omission in a study that was supposed to address these types of concerns.
Contrary to the GAO’s assessment, the vast majority of community land
grants were not confirmed as Mexico would have done and, in light of the
disastrous implications of these misconfirmations, by no measure should be
considered successfully confirmed by the federal government.
These oversights skewed the numbers the GAO used to support its
ultimate conclusions. The community land grants that were erroneously
confirmed as tenancies-in-common and private grants were all counted by
the GAO as land grants that were “awarded,” and the acreage contained in
those land grants was similarly regarded as “approved acreage.”151 In other
words, the GAO appeared to credit the United States for community land
grants improperly designated as tenancies-in-common or private grants just
as if the grant had been properly approved as a community grant. The
entire category of 84 “confirmed” non-Pueblo community grants was
treated by the GAO as encompassing lands for which the obligations under
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo were fulfilled.152 However, while the

149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 163–64.
Id. at 8, 95.
Id. at 92–95, 149.
See id. at 146–60.
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accuracy of the confirmation is highly relevant to the question of whether
Treaty obligations were met, the GAO did not provide a breakdown of the
84 “confirmed” grants to distinguish those grants that were subject to
significant land loss as a direct result of erroneous confirmations. The
numbers and chart below are an attempt to address this shortcoming by the
GAO by providing figures as to the land tenure in which the 84 confirmed
community grants were actually confirmed.
The GAO concluded that over 68 percent of the 154 community
land grants were confirmed, and that 63.5 percent of the community land
grant acreage was awarded.153 When looking only at the 131 non-Pueblo
community land grants, the GAO found that 84 of those (64 percent) were
confirmed. However, these 84 community grants included: (1) grants that
were confirmed as private grants, (2) grants that were confirmed as
tenancies-in-common, and (3) grants that were stripped of their common
lands before approval.
Looking strictly at the 131 non-Pueblo community land grants, only
20 of those were actually confirmed to the community itself with their
common lands intact.154 That is, only 20 of those land grants were confirmed
by the United States in the land-tenure pattern that Spain or Mexico
recognized for a community land grant. For the vast majority of community
land grants, the common lands did not survive the U.S. confirmation
process as true common lands. Instead those common lands were confirmed
in some other land ownership pattern that afforded less protection for
maintaining the common lands intact.
For seven of the 131 non-Pueblo community grants, common lands
were stripped from the grant and passed into federal government
ownership. In 30 cases, the grant was confirmed as a private grant, and the
entirety of the unallotted lands passed to the heirs and assigns of a single
individual. In 27 cases, the grant was confirmed as a tenancy-in-common
and the common lands became an assortment of privately-owned fractional
shares. In other words, more community lands grants were confirmed in a
land-tenure pattern unrecognized by Spain or Mexico for community land
grants (27) than were awarded in the form of a true community grant with
true common lands (20). Forty-seven of the 131 non-Pueblo community
grants were not confirmed at all.

153.
154.

Id. at 95–96.
Original research on file with authors.
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Table 1:155 Results for the 131 Non–Pueblo Community Grants Identified
by the GAO

20 land
grants

Correctly confirmed in a community grant ownership
pattern
• 15% of total
• 24% of those confirmed

64 land
grants

Confirmed in a non-community grant ownership pattern
• 30 confirmed as individual grants
• 27 confirmed as tenancies-in-common
• 7 stripped of common lands (Sandoval)

47 land
grants

Not confirmed: rejected or no proceedings on the merits
of the claim

The relatively low number of proper community grant
confirmations156 provides both a sobering appraisal of the outcome of the
U.S. confirmation process and some insight into why so few land grants
survived into modern times as self-governing entities administering intact
common lands. In order to survive in this way, a land grant had to not only
be recognized as a valid grant—47 were not—but to have its common lands
recognized as belonging to the community itself, rather than to the federal
government, a private individual, or a group of individuals as their own
private property. The fact that this was not done in the vast majority of

155. Original research on file with authors. Research was based on the original Surveyor
General and/or CPLC files at the New Mexico State Records Center and Archives in Santa
Fe, N.M.
156. Although it is clear that the number of community lands grants confirmed as they
would have been recognized under Mexico should have been much higher than 20, it is a
more difficult task to determine exactly how many. The GAO in its 2001 Report made the first
published attempt to characterize each of the 295 New Mexico land grants as either a
community grant or an individual grant. Although here we use the GAO’s determination of
154 community grants (and 131 non-Pueblo community grants) as the baseline number of
community land grants in New Mexico, we do so with some reluctance. As indicated
elsewhere in this report, Spanish and Mexican granting documents did not use the
distinguishing terms “community” or “private” grants as labels, so it is a judgment call in
some cases whether a grant was in fact a community or private grant, and people may not
agree with the GAO’s characterization in every case. Almost certainly, some of the 131 nonPueblo community lands grants that were designated in the 2001 GAO Report would have
been regarded under Mexican law as private or individual grants, and the reverse is also true
with respect to the GAO’s designation of individual grants. This leaves the actual number of
non-Pueblo community grants existing in New Mexico at the time of U.S. sovereignty—of
which only 20 were truly confirmed as community grants—open to question.
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cases resulted in the loss of vast amounts of common lands beyond the
amount the GAO attributed to the federal confirmation process. Over time,
these losses undermined the economies of many communities that
depended on those common lands. In its evaluation of the federal
confirmation process, the GAO simply failed to account for these erroneous
confirmations or the significant land losses that resulted.
III. TAMELING V. UNITED STATES FREEHOLD CO. AND THE
MYTHICAL MONTOYA REMEDY
One of the GAO’s most egregious errors is its repeated reliance on
a since-overturned state district court case, Montoya v. Tecolote, for the
notion that federal confirmations were not “final” as to parties with adverse
claims, and that people who believed they were the rightful owners, but
were not awarded the grant (“third parties”), remain free to challenge
confirmations in state court.157 Throughout the report, the GAO states that
errors in the confirmation process could be remedied by collateral attacks
in the state courts, despite the fact that courts have routinely rejected such
claims by land grant heirs.158 Insisting such state court claims are viable, the
GAO also concludes that confirmations were not “final” as to all parties, so
less rigorous due process was required under Mathews v. Eldridge. The GAO
reasons that “post-deprivation hearings” of third-party claims in state court
would, in addition, remedy any lack of due process in the confirmation
process.159 Each of these claims is simply inaccurate, beginning with the
GAO’s premise that third parties may challenge a congressional
confirmation in state court—a notion that could not be further from the
legal experience of New Mexico land grant claimants over the past 150
years.
A. Contrary to the GAO’s Claims, Tameling Precluded State Court
Challenges to Federal Land Grant Confirmations
In 1876, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, regardless of the validity
of a particular land grant under Spanish or Mexican law, Congress’s
confirmation of a grant under the 1854 Act—whether as a particular type
or size, or to a particular entity or individual—constituted a final decision on
the matter which had to be appealed through the political rather than

157. The district court’s decision in Montoya v. Tecolote Land Grant, No. D-412-CV-1999322
(4th Jud. Dist.), was reversed in Montoya v. Tecolote Land Grant, 2008-NMCA-014, ¶ 33, 143
N.M. 413, 422, 176 P.3d 1145, 1154, cert. quashed as improvidently granted, 2008-NMCERT-001,
143 N.M 398, 176 P.3d 1130.
158. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 64, 66, 71 n.59, 80 n.67, 136 n.126.
159. See id. at 137–38.
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judicial channels.160 The Court reasoned that, unlike the “essentially
judicial” process established to adjudicate California land grants, the Act of
1854 establishing the New Mexico Surveyor General/congressional
confirmation process differed markedly in that “[n]o jurisdiction over such
claims in New Mexico was conferred upon the courts.”161 Instead, the Office
of the Surveyor General of New Mexico was established to determine the
original nature, origin, character, extent and validity of each land grant
under Mexican law.162 Once Congress acted on the Surveyor General’s
recommendation and confirmed a particular grant, any claim of error in
Congress’s determination was not subject to judicial review. Rather,
according to the Court, “[t]his was [sic] matter for the consideration of
Congress; and we deem ourselves concluded by the action of that
body…[S]uch an act [of Congress] passes the title of the United States as
effectually as if it contained in terms a grant de novo.”163
Contrary to the GAO’s contention that third party claimants could
challenge a congressional confirmation in state court, Tameling and its
progeny foreclosed any judicial review of such confirmations, notwithstanding that those persons aggrieved by that confirmation might possess
evidence as to the error of the congressional determination. In such cases,
a claimant’s only remedy is to seek relief from the political branch.164 A
court is without jurisdiction to even hear such evidence and must dismiss
the claim.
In the past 130 years, Tameling has been repeatedly affirmed for the
proposition that third-party claimants may not collaterally attack a
congressional land grant confirmation in the courts.165 Consequently, when
community grants were wrongly patented to an individual, as in the case
of the Tierra Amarilla Grant, or wrongly patented to a group of families
rather than the community, as in the Mora Grant, these decisions were
nonetheless set in stone. In the decisions involving the Sangre de Cristo
Grant, both the Colorado state courts and the federal appeals court held
Tameling barred the third-party claimants’ arguments that their
predecessors had valid adverse claims to the grant based on Mexican law
and custom.166 Likewise, in the case of the Tierra Amarilla Grant, based on

160. Tameling v. U.S. Freehold & Emigration Co., 93 U.S. 644, 662 (1876).
161. Id. at 662.
162. Id.; Act of July 22, 1854, ch. 103, § 8, 10 Stat. 309, 309. See also Jones v. St. Louis Cattle
Co., 232 U.S. 355, 360 (1914).
163. Tameling, 93 U.S. at 663.
164. See Sanchez v. Taylor, 377 F.2d 733, 737 (10th Cir. 1967) (“If the confirmation of the
title was [in error], the question was political, not judicial”).
165. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Maxwell Land-Grant Co., 121 U.S. 325, 365–66 (1887).
166. See Sanchez, 377 F.2d at 737; Lobato v. Taylor, 13 P.3d 821, 829 (Colo. App. 2000), rev’d
on other grounds, 71 P.3d 938, 946 (Colo. 2002). In a stunning victory for land grant claimants,
the state supreme court reversed the lower court on other grounds, upholding the communal
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Tameling, state and federal courts repeatedly rejected the attempts of settlers
of the Grant to make similar claims to rights under Mexican law, thus
barring them from even putting on a case that the grant had been wrongly
confirmed as an individual rather than community grant.167 Contrary to the
GAO’s theory, there was simply no remedy for correcting the original
misconfirmation in such cases, regardless of the weight of evidence against
the original confirmation.
B. The Quitclaim Language Did Not Alter the Effect of Tameling
Again, contrary to the statements of the GAO, aside from limited
instances described below, courts have consistently applied Tameling to bar
third-party claims in spite of the language found in the confirmatory acts
and land grant patents that provided the confirmation or patent should be
“construed as a quitclaim or relinquishment upon the part of the United
States and shall not affect the adverse rights of any person or persons
whosoever.”168 In all of the decisions cited above in which the courts applied
Tameling, they did so despite similar language found in the congressional
act or patent.
The GAO itself acknowledges that courts have upheld Tameling in
spite of the quitclaim language in the confirmatory act.169 In the decisions
involving the Sangre de Cristo Grant, for instance, both the Colorado state
courts and the federal court held Tameling foreclosed adverse claims to the
Grant based on Mexican law and custom despite quitclaim language in both
the congressional Act and patent.170

use rights of the settlers’ heirs to the private grant lands under American law. See Lobato v.
Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 956 (Colo. 2002). The supreme court did not directly take issue with the
court of appeals’ Tameling analysis; it agreed generally with the lower court that Mexican law
could not be a source for the claimants’ rights. Id. at 946. The high court was able to avoid the
Tameling bar after finding the Grant was not settled until after the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and therefore it was unnecessary to consider what rights had been established under
Mexico prior to the congressional confirmation. Id.
167. See, e.g., Martinez v. Rivera, 196 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1952); H.N.D. Land Co. v. Suazo,
44 N.M. 547, 105 P.2d 744 (N.M. 1940).
168. H.N.D. Land Co., 44 N.M. at 547–52, 105 P.2d at 745–49; see also GAO REPORT, supra
note 1, at 64, 66, 132, 134; see, e.g., Act of Dec. 22, 1858, ch. 5, 11 Stat. 374, 374.
169. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 64 n.51, 136 n.126.
170. See Sanchez, 377 F.2d at 737 (“even if under Mexican law or the terms of the grant
certain settlement rights which conflicted with the congressional confirmation had been given
to third persons prior to the treaty, the quit-claim clause would nevertheless be of no avail to
appellants, because title had passed to the United States”); Lobato v. Taylor, 13 P.3d at 829
(Colo. App. 2000) (contrary to plaintiffs’ arguments that the quitclaim language preserved
their claims, “Tameling established the finality of the 1860 Act confirming title in [the private
grantee] and foreclosed judicial review of claims based on rights that assertedly arose before
the date of the Act.”). As discussed in supra note 166, the state supreme court reversed the
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Likewise, contrary to the GAO’s claims,171 courts also lack
jurisdiction to consider adverse claims that may have derived from a
separate land grant, except in those rare instances where a conflicting claim
was also recognized by Congress as valid. Thus, in cases in which Congress
confirmed two independent but conflicting grants, courts have held that this
quitclaim language reserved the rights of each as against the other.172 For a
court to have jurisdiction to adjudicate such “adverse rights” under a
quitclaim proviso in the patent or relevant statute, these adverse claims
must first be addressed to Congress, not to the courts.
This analysis is supported by the facts and language of Brown and
Beard v. Federy,173 cases cited by the GAO in support of its contrary claim
that a congressional confirmation affected only the claimant rather than any
third parties.174 In Brown, the New Mexico Supreme Court explained that in
order for a congressional confirmation to be deemed not conclusive, so as
to confer jurisdiction on the courts to adjudicate an adverse claim to the
same lands, the adverse party must have “title under the former sovereign
which is, equally with that of the confirmee, entitled to protection by the
United States.”175 According to the court, Congress recognized that adverse
land grant claims often progressed simultaneously through the
confirmation processes, in rare instances resulting in congressional
confirmations to overlapping land grant lands.176 The quitclaim proviso
became necessary to confer judicial jurisdiction over these overlapping but
separately confirmed land grant claims.177 As illustrated by Brown, for an

lower court on other grounds in its landmark decision upholding the communal use rights
of the settlers’ heirs to the private grant lands. Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938 (Colo. 2002).
Another example is H.N.D. Land Co. v. Suazo, which the GAO attempts to distinguish as a type
of case to which Tameling did apply. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 106 & n.89. There the New
Mexico Supreme Court held it lacked jurisdiction under Tameling to question the confirmation
of the Land Grant to an individual rather than a community, despite similar quitclaim
language in the confirmatory act and patent. See H.N.D. Land Co., 44 N.M. at 548, 105 P.2d at
745, 746–47 (referring to the quitclaim proviso as the “ordinary and familiar clause found in
all other like patents of the time”).
171. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 71 n.59, 107.
172. See Bd. of Trustees of Anton Chico Land Grant v. Brown, 33 N.M. 398, 399–400, 269
P. 51, 52–53 (N.M. 1928) (holding that, where the overlapping Anton Chico and Preston Beck
grants were each confirmed by Congress, Congress reserved the rights of each of the two
confirmees as against each other); Jones v. St. Louis Land & Cattle Co., 232 U.S. 355, 361 (1914)
(“if there be claims under two patents[,] each of which reserves the right of the other parties, the
inquiry must extend to the character of the original concession”) (emphasis added).
173. See Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. 478, 491 (1865); Bd. of Trustees of Anton Chico Land Grant,
269 P. at 53–55.
174. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 136 n.126.
175. Bd. of Trustees of Anton Chico Land Grant, 33 N.M. at 399–400, 269 P. at 53 (emphasis
added).
176. See id. at 52.
177. See id.
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adverse claimant to be equally “entitled to protection,” so as to confer
jurisdiction upon the courts, required a congressional confirmation.178
Similarly, in Beard v. Federy,179 the defendants claimed lands that
had already been patented through the federal process established for
California land grants. The Supreme Court held that quitclaim language in
the federal statute allowed judicial review of adverse claims only where
such claimants held “superior titles, such as will enable them to resist
successfully any action of the government in disposing of the property.”180
Although the defendants claimed title deriving from Spain or Mexico, they
had failed to seek and obtain a separate federal confirmation.181 The court
held that such a claim, unsupported by a federal patent, lacked standing under
the quitclaim proviso to raise such a claim.182 Courts have been consistent
in this respect; apart from the limited Brown-type exception to Tameling,
courts have not applied the quitclaim clause to permit judicial review of a
congressional land grant determination. Rather, the only feasible remedy
for land grant claimants who dispute a federal confirmation is to appeal to
Congress.
C. The Mythical Montoya Remedy
The GAO’s reliance on a single state district court decision, Montoya
v. Tecolote, for the notion that claimants still have a remedy in cases of
wrongful confirmations—a claim otherwise at odds with over a century of
federal and state case law—suggests a remarkable lack of candor. At the
very least the GAO’s claim was misplaced, particularly in light of the court
of appeals’ recent reversal of the district court’s decision.183
There appears to be no question that, after Congress confirmed a
land grant, courts simply lacked jurisdiction to second-guess what thirdparty rights may have existed to the same land under the original Spanish
or Mexican grant. If Congress confirmed a grant improperly, or if due
process was circumvented in the congressional confirmation process, the
damage was permanently done. The GAO’s claims to the contrary—in

178. Id. at 53.
179. Beard, 70 U.S. 478.
180. Id. at 493.
181. See id. at 489.
182. See id. at 492–93; cf. State ex rel. State Game Comm’n v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M.
207, 268, 182 P.2d 421, 459 (1945) (recognizing “a confirmation by Congress under the
congressional act involved, determined that a Mexican grant was valid” and suggesting that,
under the quitclaim language, courts only have jurisdiction to go behind such a confirmation
where Congress has first confirmed an adverse land grant claim).
183. Montoya v. Tecolote Land Grant, 2008-NMCA-014, ¶ 33, 143 N.M. 413, 422, 176 P.3d
1145, 1154 (finding the district court decision was contrary to the Tameling bar), cert. quashed
as improvidently granted, 2008-NMCERT-001, 143 N.M. 398, 176 P.3d 1130.
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support of its assertion that improper confirmations were not final and
could be remedied and due process protections relaxed (and ultimately
remedied if violated in the confirmation process)—are unfounded and
unsupported by case law.
The GAO’s discussion of Tameling also seriously understates the
lasting harmful effect of that decision in terms of foreclosing opportunities
for corrective court action. By wrongly concluding that those opportunities
existed and continue to exist, and thereby suggesting that land grant heirs
have neglected those opportunities, the GAO places unwarranted and
misplaced responsibility on heirs for not “recovering” more lands through
court action. Clearly heirs have made considerable efforts to overcome or
limit Tameling, finding the barrier posed by that case to be all too real.
IV. POST-CONFIRMATION LAND LOSSES
Alongside its reliance on the notion that mistaken confirmations
could be remedied in the courts, the GAO neglects to acknowledge the
significant legal implications of misconfirmations on the ultimate fate of
land grants and common lands, instead ascribing many of the losses of
improperly confirmed common lands to the actions of land grantees and
heirs themselves.
A. Boundary Conflicts
The confirmation process deprived some land grants of their lands
in ways other than through miscalculating the nature of the grant itself. In
some cases, particularly in the CPLC era, the United States argued for more
constricted grant boundaries than the grantees understood had been
designated by Spain or Mexico.184 In other cases, the confirmation of one
grant resulted in other valid land grant lands encompassing some of the
same lands being rejected or otherwise unable to be heard due to reasons
unrelated to the merits of the grant.185 The GAO notes the factual and legal
problems encountered by these grantees, but neglects to relate the manner
in which these confirmations were handled in light of federal obligations
under the Treaty.
The establishment of land grant boundaries, which in turn
determined the size of the grant, was a process of matching landmarks
described in the Spanish and Mexican granting documents to the actual
landmarks on the ground.186 Since the grants were almost never formally
surveyed in the Spanish and Mexican periods, the total area granted was

184.
185.
186.

See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 102–04.
See id. at 108–10.
See id. at 65–66, 102–04.

900

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

not known and therefore there was no way to corroborate a particular
landmark in the field if there was uncertainty as to whether it was correct.187
The GAO gives a fairly detailed account of how such factual uncertainty
was potentially open to abuse in favor of claimants during the Surveyor
General era, citing such things as contract surveyors who were paid by the
mile and Surveyors General who relied heavily on claimants to point out
the correct landmarks.188 The GAO also relates how controversial boundary
designations, such as the one that resulted in the Maxwell Grant being
awarded to a private individual in the amount of 1.7 million acres, caused
Congress to cease further confirmations until the enactment of the Act of
1891, which, among other things, limited private grant awards to a ceiling
of 11 square leagues (48,800 acres) per person.189
The GAO does not recount, however, the manner in which federal
officials in the later Surveyor General era and under the CPLC consistently
argued for grant boundaries that seemed unreasonably constricted in
relation to the boundary calls in the grant documents. Historical research
suggests that certain federal actors may have consciously done this out of
a sense that they were engaged in “reform” or that it was what they were
hired to do.190
For instance, the Juan Bautista Valdez Grant was recommended to
be reduced from 250,000 acres to less than 1,500 acres by Surveyors General
Atkinson and Julian based on the unlikely argument that, where the
boundaries asked for in the petition to the Spanish government were less
extensive than the boundaries designated in the actual act of possession, the

187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id.
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 70–74, 79–80.
U.S. Attorney Matthew Reynolds reported to the U.S. Attorney General in 1894:
In New Mexico and Arizona the total area claimed in the suits disposed
of…was 4,784,651 acres; amount confirmed, 779,611 acres; amount rejected
and not confirmed 4,005,040 acres. The result is very gratifying to me…you
will notice that in most of the grants where judgments were obtained, the
areas have been much reduced. This result was secured by result of your
sustaining me in my request for sufficient means to employ assistance to
investigate these claims and obtain the evidence for the defense…the
amount of land saved in this way alone during the term of court just past
will more than compensate the Government for the cost of this court and the
salaries of its officials during the entire time for which it was created.
REPORT OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY FOR THE COURT OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS, 1894 ATT’Y GEN.
ANN. REP., ex. 4, at 4. Further, Surveyor General Julian, in commenting on the evidence for
various boundary calls for the Cañon de Chama Grant, stated: “If any descriptive words [in
the boundary calls] were susceptible of two meanings, the one implying extension and the
other restriction, he [the Surveyor General] was bound to govern himself by the latter. This
was his clear duty under the law.” Opinion of George W. Julian regarding the Cañon de
Chama Grant, Dec. 11, 1885, SG 71, roll 20, frame 676 (on file with NMSRCA).
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petition should prevail over the act of possession. There, the Spanish act of
possession augmented the valley lands asked for in the petition with higherelevation common lands, a typical thing for the Spanish government to do
when establishing a community grant.
In addition, the CPLC process was structured so that the U.S.
Attorney could assume an adversarial posture with respect to land grant
claimants, and he was under no directive to be balanced or reasonable in his
positions.191 United States Attorney Matthew Reynolds took a similar
approach to the Juan Bautista Valdez claim as Surveyor General Julian,
arguing for boundary designations that virtually eliminated all of the
common lands. Likewise, the Santo Domingo de Cundiyo Grant was
reduced from 20,000 acres192 to about 2,137 acres after the U.S. Attorney
challenged three of the four boundaries claimed.193 Land grant claimants
who had received an initial favorable recommendation from the Surveyor
General but ended up receiving their final disposition from the CPLC were
very likely to see a reduction in acreage as part of that final disposition.194
Claimants did not tend to have the same level of resources as the United
States to litigate boundary issues, and when they found themselves in a
boundary dispute, the courts placed the burden of proof on the claimants
and not on the government.195
While the GAO noted the occurrence of these boundary disputes,
it left unexplored a number of fundamental issues raised by this apparent
shift in the role of federal actors in establishing land grant boundaries. Most
important was the question of whether Congress established the role for the
U.S. Attorney in the CPLC process, and funded that office, with the
intention that the U.S. Attorney would do something other than seek the
most reasonable and likely interpretation of the grant boundary calls.
Certainly there is no suggestion in the CPLC Act that the U.S. Attorney’s
duty was to secure as much land for the federal public domain as possible,
regardless of the language of the grant document. Thus the positions taken
by the U.S. Attorney and Surveyor General Julian raise the possibility that
the intentions of Congress to honor the Treaty and the actions of federal
agencies and employees may have been inconsistent with one another.196

191. Id.
192. WESTPHALL, supra note 120, at 257.
193. Jennifer Davis, Perceptions of Power: The Court of Private Land Claims and the
Shrinking of the Santo Domingo de Cundiyo Grant (1983–84) (unpublished paper written for
the Univ. of N.M. School of Law, on file with authors); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at
104, tbl. 19 (showing that 14 additional grants were significantly reduced in acreage in the
CPLC era after boundary disputes with the United States).
194. See infra Part V.B, at Table 2.
195. Whitney v. United States, 167 U.S. 529, 548 (1897).
196. See discussion infra Part V.B.
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A different issue was raised for land grant claimants when one
grant was wholly located within another grant, or where two or more grants
had overlapping boundaries and one land grant was awarded the entire
overlap before the second grant was able to assert its own claim to those
lands.197 As the GAO acknowledges, there was a jurisdictional bar in the Act
of 1891 that prevented the CPLC from even considering a claim for lands
that had already been part of a congressional confirmation.198
While this “first-come-first-serve” policy avoided a scenario where
the CPLC might create conflicting awards to the same land, the implication
for the grant that came later was that it was effectively rejected by rule, as
opposed to being considered and the conflict resolved on the merits. In the
case of a valid community land grant and wholly subsumed within an
earlier-confirmed grant and not confirmed as a community grant, the blow
was twofold. The later grant’s common lands that were incorporated into
the earlier grant’s award lost their character as common lands and were
privatized, with the result that the residents ultimately lost the ability to use
them as common lands. Moreover, the later grant also lost any local control
or governing authority as a community over those lands as they passed into
ownership of an entity outside the community.
Most of the 27 community grants that the GAO characterizes as
those that grantees “failed to pursue” faced this problem of being contained
within or substantially overlapped by an earlier-confirmed grant.199 The
phrase “failed to pursue” conveys an unfair impression as it applies to these
grants. Their lands were essentially rejected by application of the
jurisdictional bar and not from any lack of effort or interest in gaining
confirmation. The GAO does otherwise accurately categorize these grants
under the broader category of “rejected” grants.200 From the perspective of
the later grant claimants, the rule created a fait accompli that they had no
way of anticipating and that left them with no recourse within the CPLC
process.

197. For example, the Guadalupita Grant was made in 1837 only after Alcalde Juan
Nepomoceno Trujillo sought and received the permission of the principal citizens of the Town
of Mora Grant to allow the formation of a new settlement within the exterior boundaries of
the Mora Grant. However, because the Mora Grant was confirmed in its entirety by Congress
in 1860, it precluded confirmation of the Guadalupita Grant and it is probably for that reason
that the claimants withdrew their claim, which was pending before the CPLC. Guadalupita
Grant, SG 152, roll 27, frame 1573 (on file with NMSRCA).
198. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 108–09; see Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 854, § 13, cl. 4.
The CPLC apparently applied this same bar to lands that the CPLC had already awarded as
well. In this way, for example, the CPLC’s confirmation of the Juan Jose Lovato Grant barred
consideration of a number of grants that were contained within that Grant that later came
before the court. See id. at 109–10, tbl. 21.
199. See id. at 109–10, tbl. 21.
200. See id. at 108, 212.
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The GAO’s analysis omits any discussion of the harshness with
which the jurisdictional bar applied to later claimants, and whether a
mechanism that more closely resembles how Spain or Mexico might have
resolved the conflicting claims could have been adopted by the United
States to address these later grant claims.201 That question is still relevant for
Congress today.202
B. Myth of “Voluntary” Post-Confirmation Action by Heirs
In its discussion of post-confirmation losses, the GAO focuses only
on whether the federal government had a post-confirmation fiduciary duty
to land grantees, comparable to that owed to Indian Tribes and Pueblos,
rather than recognizing the legal effects of the misconfirmations themselves
on the fate of land grants and common lands.203 Concluding there was no
such duty, the GAO ascribes the loss of improperly confirmed common
lands to the actions of land grantees and heirs themselves and to state
law.204 This analysis overlooks how the federal government’s breach of its
original duty to land grantees, by confirming land grants improperly, set in
motion the ultimate loss of common lands. Rather than breaching a postconfirmation duty, the breach had already occurred—resulting inevitably
in significant losses to community grants.
As discussed above, the GAO’s treatment of the problem of
wrongful confirmations is wholly inadequate. The problem of tenancies-in-

201. In cases where overlapping claims had both been approved by the Surveyor General,
the CPLC “jurisdictional bar” did not apply. These types of conflicts tended not to be decided
by federal officials and at times ended up in state court, as an exception to the Tameling rule,
where inconsistent versions of a first-come-first-serve analysis were applied. For example, in
1860 Congress confirmed the Town of Anton Chico and the Preston Beck Grants, which
included an approximately 120,000-acre overlap between the two grants. When the Preston
Beck owners sought to quiet title in order to partition the Grant, the Board of Trustees of the
Town of Anton Chico Grant was forced to intervene in order to protect its interest in the
overlap. Although the Anton Chico Grant preceded the Preston Beck historically, the New
Mexico Supreme Court asserted, based on the Sandoval precedent, that because the disputed
area was an unalloted part of the Anton Chico common lands it was part of grant de novo
made by Congress and the Preston Beck Grant had superior title. Board of Trustees of Anton
Chico Land Grant v. Brown, 33 N.M. 398, 269 P. 51 (1928).
202. For instance, two conflicting claims that were recommended to Congress by the
Surveyor General were resolved by Congress contemporaneously to the satisfaction of the two
groups. There, the Baca family and the Town of Las Vegas were both determined by the
Surveyor General to have valid grants to the exact same lands. The Baca family agreed to
waive its claim to the lands and Congress approved an equivalent quantity of land chosen by
the Baca family from among unclaimed lands in the federal public domain. See EBRIGHT, supra
note 34, 203–04.
203. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, ch. 4.
204. Id.
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common, for example, lacks any analysis by the GAO of how tenancies-incommon came about, who was responsible for their creation, whether they
were consistent with Spanish and Mexican law, or their direct consequences
in terms of land loss. The GAO’s version of this history is that the problem
of tenancies-in-common was simply a post-confirmation problem.205 The
GAO implies that the federal government did everything it was obligated
to in confirming these grants, regardless of how they were confirmed, and
that the loss of common lands was the result of later causes unrelated to the
confirmation process:
Some land grant heirs and advocates of land grant reform
have expressed concern that the United States failed to ensure
continued community ownership of common lands after the
lands were awarded during the confirmation process…Land
grant acreage has been lost, for example…by partitioning
suits that have divided up community land grants into
individual parcels…[C]laimants have lost substantially more
acreage after the confirmation process…than they believe they
lost during the confirmation process.” 206
This passage and its context is puzzling for a number of reasons.
First, it fails to acknowledge that the critical point at which the loss of
community ownership occurred was during the confirmation process when
the common lands were converted to private tenancies-in-common or other
private landholdings. It is not that the United States “failed to ensure
continued community ownership of common lands” after confirmation in
these cases, but that the confirmation itself failed to give legal recognition
to the community ownership of the common lands.207 The GAO seems to
regard partitioning as the event in which community ownership was
compromised, without acknowledging any link between partitioning and
the conversion of land tenure that occurred earlier during the confirmation
process. In the same way, the entire history of land speculation and sharepurchasing that was made possible only because of the creation of
tenancies-in-common is absent from the GAO Report, so no context is given
for understanding an entire major category of land loss that would not have
been possible under Spanish and Mexican law. Also, curiously, partitioning
is incorrectly described in the passage quoted above as “divid[ing] up
community land grants into individual parcels,” when in fact partitioning
typically was the sale of the entirety of the former common lands in one
block after they had been wrongly designated as a tenancy-in-common.208

205.
206.
207.
208.

See id. at 146–60.
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 146.
Id.
See EBRIGHT, supra note 34, at 42–43.
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While, according to the GAO, the problem was rooted in the existence and
application of the state partition law,209 this is a completely erroneous way
to frame the issue, both legally and historically. The state partition law,
enacted in 1876, applied only to tenancies-in-common, such as land owned
jointly by family members, and was a useful tool in that context and still is
today. 210 In itself, the partition law was not necessarily a law or policy that
was inimical to community ownership of land grants. As discussed above,
the partition law never should have applied to community lands grants. It
was not the partition suit that privatized the common lands; the prior
federal confirmation process had already done so. Once these lands were
privatized, any number of laws, such as trespass laws, could have been
used or invoked to enforce these newly created private rights and deny
formerly lawful access to the former common lands. The root of the
problem was not the state laws relating to private property, but the
privatization of the common lands that made those laws suddenly
applicable.
The effect of the GAO framing the issue in this way is that it never
reached a discussion of how critically important it was for the federal
confirmation process to designate land grants in the proper land-tenure
pattern, and the considerable consequences in terms of land loss where it
failed to do so. On page 152 of the GAO Report, the authors relate, without
comment, the contentions of land grant heirs and legal scholars to this
effect. But there is no analysis or evaluation of these points, nor do the
GAO’s conclusions incorporate such considerations:
[N]either Article VIII nor Article IX [of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo] created any fiduciary duty of the United
States to protect owners of confirmed community land grant
acreage in a special manner superior to the protections
afforded to other U.S. citizens. Rather, community land grant
owners were to have the same property protections,
guarantees, and responsibilities that all U.S. citizens had,
which would include…being subject to partition suits…and
any other legal mechanism potentially resulting in loss of real
property ownership.211
This conclusion simply repeats the earlier analytical errors by stating that
“community land grant owners” were “subject to…partition suits,” despite
the fact that the partition law clearly only applied to tenancies-in-common.

209.
210.
211.

See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 147–56.
1875–76 N.M. Laws ch. 3, codified at N.M. STAT. §§ 42-5-1 to -9 (1978).
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 154.
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Community land grants were not subject to partition suits when they were
correctly confirmed as such.212
These key analytical concepts for understanding land losses were
either absent or badly misstated in the GAO Report. These oversights also
skewed the numbers the GAO used to support its conclusions. The
community land grants that were erroneously confirmed as tenancies-incommon and private grants were all counted by the GAO as land grants
that were “awarded,” and the acreage contained in those land grants was
similarly regarded as “approved acreage.”213
The effect is that the GAO credits the United States for community
land grants improperly designated as tenancies-in-common or as private
grants in the exact same manner as if the grant had been properly approved
as a community grant. The entire category of 84 confirmed non-Pueblo
community grants is seemingly regarded by the GAO as land for which the
obligations under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo were fulfilled.214
However, clearly the question of the correctness of the confirmation is
highly relevant to the question of whether Treaty obligations were met. Yet
the GAO does not provide a breakdown of the 84 “confirmed” grants to
distinguish those grants that were subject to significant types of land loss as
a direct result of erroneous confirmations. Table I in Part II.E, above, is an
attempt to address this shortcoming by the GAO by providing figures as to
the land tenure in which the 84 confirmed community grants were actually
confirmed.
Determining the number of acres lost during the “post-confirmation” era as a result of misconfirmations is a greater challenge. For example,
partitioned grants include 10 “original documentation” community grants
(Mora, Santa Bárbara, Cañon de San Diego, Las Trampas, Domingo
Fernández, Nicolas Durán de Chávez, Caja del Rio, Bernabe Manuel
Montano, Rancho del Rio Grande, and Ojo de San Joseì); and five “selfidentified” community grants (Alameda, La Majada, Sebastián Martín,
Polvadera, Black Mesa, and Francisco Montes Vigil). None of these grants
was confirmed by the United States as a community grant, yet all of these
are grants and acreage for which, by virtue of confirmation, the GAO seems
to have considered the Treaty to have been satisfied.215 The total acreage
sold or otherwise privatized through partition suits brought under these
grants was probably about 1.6 million acres, though this number could be
much higher, as systematic research on partitioned land grants has never
been done.

212.
213.
214.
215.

See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 1.
Id. at 146–60.
Id.
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Similarly, community grants lost by buyouts of designated tenantsin-common and of private grantees (such as in the case of the 594,000-acre
Tierra Amarilla Grant) have not been systematically analyzed and would
require further research. Since the GAO did not account for these in the 3.4
million-acre figure it characterizes as lost during the confirmation process,
that figure would be modified upwards significantly to reflect additional
acreage lost due to misconfirmations of community grants.
One of the most troubling of the GAO’s conclusions—and one that
is frequently quoted—stems from these flawed figures and the flawed
assumptions underlying them. Table 27 of the GAO Report purports to
enumerate post-confirmation land losses not attributable to flaws in the
federal confirmation process. The table lists the 84 “confirmed” land grants,
and compares the vast “original acreage confirmed” with the virtually nonexistent “current community acreage owned.” In the accompanying text, the
GAO concludes:
[I]t appears that virtually all of the 5.3 million acres in New
Mexico that were confirmed to the 84 non-Pueblo Indian
community grants have since been lost by transfer from the
original community grantees to other entities.
…
This means that claimants have lost substantially more
acreage after completion of the confirmation process—almost
all of the 5.3 million acres that they were awarded—than they
believe they lost during the confirmation process—the 3.4
million acres they believe they should have been awarded but
were not…216
Upon examination, however, the grants listed in Table 27 include
grants confirmed as tenancies-in-common and then partitioned (e.g., Town
of Mora, Santa Barbara, Town of Las Trampas); it includes the grants
affected by the Sandoval precedent, which the confirmation process left with
virtually no community-owned acreage; it also includes the privatized
Tierra Amarilla Grant and the Anton Chico Grant, whose significant
reduction in acreage, due to the botched confirmation, is described below.
In this manner the GAO characterizes what happened to the common lands
of these grants as a “transfer from the original community grantees to other
entities” in a time and manner unrelated to the confirmation process.217
For many of these grants, this is a serious misstatement, historically
and legally. In 1875 more than 1,000 Mora Grant residents petitioned the
federal government and pleaded with federal officials to properly confirm

216.
217.

GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 146–47.
Id. at 11.
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their grant as community-owned, to no avail.218 This misconfirmation of the
Mora Grant by federal officials is the most important factor in why there is
so little current community-owned acreage within the Grant today, rather
than because of some post-confirmation “transfer” to other entities by the
Mora residents. Likewise, the Tierra Amarilla Grant residents have been to
state and federal court five times to try to undo the erroneous confirmation
of their community grant as a private grant.219 That is what happened after
the confirmation process, though it was during the confirmation process that
the community land loss occurred, when Francisco Martinez was
improperly awarded the entire Grant.220
Even in some cases where the land grantees knew they were
parting with their common lands, the federal government bears a significant
amount of responsibility for the circumstances under which they did so. For
example, the Anton Chico Grant would not have had to “spend” 135,000
acres of common lands on attorneys fees and as a legal settlement, were it
not faced with having to undo the legal confusion that resulted from one
branch of the federal government (Congress) confirming the Grant as a
community grant, while another branch of the federal government
(Secretary of the Interior) patented the Grant as a tenancy-in-common, while
still a third branch of the federal government (Surveyor General) delivered
possession of the patent as a private grant to the successors of the poblador
principal.221 The GAO cited the Anton Chico Grant as an example of land
loss through payment in land for legal services and described the nature of
the legal services as “outside the confirmation process.”222 This is yet
another example of the GAO failing to acknowledge federal actions in the
confirmation process that were the proximate cause of later land loss.
The entire treatment by the GAO of “confirmed” community
grants, and Table 27 in particular: (1) completely obscures the link between
land tenure as confirmed and losses by combining all “confirmed” grants
in one statistic without regard to correctness; (2) suggests that as long as the
United States confirmed a grant to someone, it adequately performed its
obligation under the Treaty; (3) conveys an element of self-determination
on the part of the community which did not exist for many grants, and in
fact had been taken away by the erroneous confirmation; and (4) conveys
the impression that, because of the passage of time between the erroneous
confirmation and the assertion of private property rights (e.g., fencing,
partition), the federal government bears no responsibility for the
consequences of creating the private rights in the first place. Table 27, and

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
See supra note 86.
See id.; EBRIGHT, THE TIERRA AMARILLA GRANT, supra note 77, at 14–20.
Rock, supra note 112, at 88–91.
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 151.
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the GAO’s figures and conclusions discussed in this part, give a seriously
misleading impression of what actually occurred in the history of New
Mexico land grants.223
V. REJECTED CLAIMS AND ACREAGE
As discussed above, land grant lands were frequently rejected
during the CPLC era because a grant was wholly subsumed within another
grant or because the overlapping claim had already been confirmed to
another grant. In addition, land grants were entirely rejected based on
technicalities that would not have applied under Spain or Mexico. While it
acknowledges the narrow decisions that resulted in the rejection of these
claims, the GAO Report omits any critical analysis of the decisions
themselves. The GAO Report underemphasizes the inequity of such
decision making and the consequences thereof, particularly when a number
of these grants were recommended for confirmation by prior federal actors,
but then were ultimately rejected after Congress failed to act on these
confirmations and the grants became subject to the stricter standards of
subsequent decision makers.224
A. Grants Rejected, Withdrawn, or Dismissed Due to Erroneous
Holdings
Part I above discusses how the CPLC and U.S. Supreme Court in
certain cases applied an overly narrow view of their authority under the Act
of 1891, and how the GAO failed to consider evidence that Congress
intended in that Act for the CPLC to not be confined to such a strict
application of Spanish and Mexican law in considering the validity of land
grants. In a number of cases, land grants were rejected as invalid on
technical grounds that Spain or Mexico would not have applied to such
grants.225 These decisions appeared increasingly arbitrary, as cases with
similar facts resulted in vastly different outcomes.226 Numerous examples

223. Without question there were post-confirmation losses of common lands for properly
confirmed community grants as well, as described by the GAO in Chapter 4 (e.g., sales of
common lands by land grant boards of trustees). However, there were only 20 non-Pueblo
grants confirmed as community grants, out of 84 confirmed, with the other 64 confirmed as
private grants or tenancies-in-common. See supra Part II.E. So the land losses associated with
these latter types of misconfirmations were a much more significant problem, numerically
speaking, than land losses associated with properly confirmed community grants.
224. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 210–11.
225. Id. at 118–23.
226. See supra Part I. Prior to the supreme court’s Hayes decision, the CPLC made a
persuasive statement in approving the Town of Bernalillo Grant as to why it made no
practical sense—and why it made no sense under the U.S. Treaty obligations—to deny grants
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in New Mexico land grant literature describe at length the various problems
of land grants being rejected on such technicalities.227
The GAO does make brief mention of the effect that these adverse
court decisions undoubtedly had on claims that were pending before the
CPLC under similar fact situations or similar evidentiary situations.228
Between the grants that were rejected in this manner by adverse precedent
when their claim was still pending, those that were directly rejected by the
court on technicalities that would not have applied under Spanish and
Mexican law, and those barred for jurisdictional reasons involving prior
confirmation of another grant, the CPLC era generated a sobering legacy of
unnecessarily rejected grants. These rejections arguably deviated from
Congress’s understanding of the United States’ Treaty obligations as they
were understood prior to 1891. Overruling such rulings may be one
appropriate remedy for Congress to consider.

based on the technicalities of who made copies of granting documents:
We know from our examination of many claims under Spanish grants…that
the practice of perpetuating in this manner the evidence of title…was
common. Indeed, that was the only way that evidence of title in the hands
of the people could be perpetuated…The papers were passed from hand to
hand as the ownership of the property changed and necessarily in the lapse
of time, they became mutilated. It is true that public records of the
proceedings relating to the grants of land were required to be made. But the
sovereignty over the country has been twice changed, once by revolution
and once by military conquest and in addition to that it is a matter of history
that there have been times of turmoil in which all civil government in the
country has been endangered. In view of these facts, it is not remarkable that
the ancient records should now be in an unsatisfactory and imperfect
condition. It has also many times been proven before us that spoilations of
the records have occurred since our own government acquired jurisdiction
over the country. It is manifest that if claimants should now be held to the
strictness of proof which would be required in the establishment of a title of
American origin, great injustice would be done, and the measures
established by the government for the purpose of carrying out its treaty
stipulations, would be made the instrument of defeating that purpose.
Decision by the Court of Private Land Claims in the case of the Town of Bernalillo Grant, PLC
258, roll 53, frame 20 (on file with NMSRCA). Subsequent to the Hayes decision, a nearly
identical fact situation was presented by the Embudo Grant in 1898. A divided CPLC rejected
the Grant, with the majority apologetically doing an about-face and asserting the restrictions
of its mandate set forth in Hayes. Chief CPLC Justice Joseph R. Reed and Justice Wilbur F.
Stone spoke to the plain injustice of the decision in a dissenting opinion reminding the other
justices that the court had confirmed the Town of Bernalillo Grant on “substantially the same
character of evidence which the court now rejects.” See Bowden, supra note 104, at 1201.
227. See EBRIGHT, supra note 34, at 127–42.
228. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 109 (“In some instances, it appears that claimants
withdrew their claims after learning that…the CPLC had previously rejected similar claims.”).

Fall 2008]

THE GAO’S 2004 REPORT

911

B. Federal Delay Resulted in Grants Faring Worse
A significant percentage of community lands grants came one step
shy of final approval after receiving a recommendation for approval by the
Surveyor General.229 Grants submitted to Congress for action on the
Surveyor General’s favorable recommendation were virtually assured final
confirmation, since Congress, when it did act on a favorable Surveyor
General recommendation, always affirmed that recommendation.230 However, after a number of circumstances brought congressional confirmations
of land grants to a standstill,231 many of these recommendations simply
languished before Congress. In the case of 56 of the 88 (64 percent) nonPueblo community land grants that received favorable recommendations,
Congress simply failed to act on the recommendations.232 Thus, nearly twothirds of these grants never benefitted from the favorable recommendation
and were forced to wait and begin the process again after 1891, when the
CPLC process was enacted; a process in which the United States played the
role of adversary and one that turned out to be significantly more
problematic for land grant claimants.
The vast majority of these 56 grants fared significantly worse under
the CPLC process, after coming so close to full recognition under the
Surveyor General process. 233 As demonstrated by Table 2, below, 26 of the
56 grants were reduced in acreage under the CPLC process, compared to
the Surveyor General’s preliminary survey or the amount of acreage stated
in the petition.
Sixteen other grants were totally or almost totally rejected under the
CPLC process, including 11 that were rejected as invalid, and five that had
their common lands entirely rejected; a result that would not have occurred
in the Surveyor General era.234 Three other grants never reached a decision
on the merits under the CPLC process, most likely because prior approval
of another grant that conflicted with the grant deprived the CPLC of
jurisdiction to consider the claim. Only 11 of the 56 grants fared the same
or better, in terms of acreage, under the CPLC process. Table 2, below,
details the final disposition of the 56 Surveyor General-approved grants on
which Congress failed to act. This table also shows which grants that were
slated for approval under one Surveyor General received a new
229. See, e.g., id. at 76, 112.
230. See id. at 62, 64, 76.
231. Id. at 52.
232. All of the grants brought before Congress in the first six years of the 1854 Surveyor
General Act were acted on by Congress in its confirmatory Act of June 21, 1860. GAO REPORT,
supra note 1, at 64. There were approximately 60 such grants, including Pueblo and nonPueblo community grants and private grants.
233. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 112–23.
234. See id. at 97, 112–23.
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recommendation for a reduction in acreage or for rejection under a
subsequent Surveyor General.235
The GAO Report acknowledges this problem, but not the
magnitude of it. The GAO discusses the causes of the congressional delay
and acknowledges that grants that would have been confirmed in the
Surveyor General era were often rejected in the CPLC era.236 The GAO also
concludes that “pursuing a land grant claim was inefficient and
burdensome for many claimants…some claims had to be presented multiple
times to different entities under different legal standards.”237 But a number
of difficult questions that arise in light of this problem remained
undiscussed by the GAO.
For instance, when Congress passed the Act of 1891, did it really
intend this type of result, i.e., that so many land grants similarly situated to
ones that it had approved in the Surveyor General era would fare so much
worse? Unquestionably Congress was trying to prevent unwarranted and
expansive private claims on federal public lands, but did Congress intend
to create obstacles to full confirmation for smaller grants containing viable
communities as well? It appears unlikely that Congress believed it was
setting such a significantly harsher standard or that it intended grants to
fare worse on this scale. Further, did Congress intend that the role of the
U.S. Attorney in the CPLC process would be to advance novel legal theories
for the rejection of community grants that were not applied in the Surveyor
General era, such as the theory that common lands did not belong to the
community grant? This also seems unlikely, at least to the degree that it
occurred under the CPLC.
It does not appear, as the GAO seems to suggest, that Congress
sought the type of harsh result that occurred after it enacted the CPLC.238
What the figures below at least suggest is an overly severe systemic
response by key federal actors (e.g., the U.S. Attorney, the Supreme Court,
or Surveyor General Julian) to the Act of 1891 or the circumstances prior to
its passage. Many otherwise perfectly valid community land grants were
negatively affected by this response and by those circumstances. This
included not only those grants that had been regarded favorably in the
Surveyor General era, but also those valid community grants that came up

235. Surveyor General Julian’s subsequent review of a formerly favorably-recommended
grant usually presaged unfavorable treatment under the CPLC process, resulting in either a
reduction in acreage or a recommendation of rejection. Of the 21 grants that Surveyor General
Julian reviewed after they were recommended for confirmation by his predecessors, Surveyor
General Julian recommended that 10 grants be ultimately rejected, nine be confirmed by
Congress (but with a reduction in the acreage to be confirmed), and two of them be confirmed
as previously suggested. See infra Part V.B, at Table 2. See also EBRIGHT, supra note 34, at 43–45.
236. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 70–87.
237. Id. at 164.
238. See, e.g., GAO REPORT supra note 1, at 78, 97, 112.
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for consideration for the first time in the CPLC era.239 This is an important
history for the present-day Congress to be aware of as it assesses possible
remedies for land grants.
Table 2: Final Disposition of Grants
Grants Recommended for Approval by Surveyor General and Not
Acted Upon by Congress240

Final
disposition:
rejection of
grant as
invalid by
CPLC or on
appeal to the
Year initially
U.S.
recommended Supreme
Name of Grant
for confirmation Court
1. Town of Alameda*
1874
2. Alamitos
1872
3. Antonio Baca*
1877
4. Arroyo Hondo
1888
5.Bernabe Manuel
1870
Montaño*
6.Town of Bernalillo
1874
7. Bosque Grande*
1874
8. Cañada de los
1874
Alamos
9. Cañada de San
1871
x
Francisco
10. Cañon de Carnue
1886
11. Cañon de Chama*
1872
12. Cebolla
1872
x
13. Chaca
1874
Mesa*
14. Town of
1872
x
Cieneguilla*
15. Cuyamungue
1871
16. Don Fernando de
1878
Taos
17. Francisco de
1878
Anaya Almazán*

Final
disposition:
found to be
valid but
common
lands totally
denied by
CPLC or U.S.
Supreme
Court

Subject to
review by
subsequent
Surveyor
General &
recommended
for rejection
Final disposition: (rej.) or
acreage reduced reduction in
by CPLC or U.S. acreage (red.
Supreme Court acr.)
x
(rej.)
x
x
(rej.)
x
x

(red. acr.)

x
x

(rej.)

x

x
x

(red. acr.)
x

(red. acr. and
rej.)

x
x
x

(red. acr.)
(Continues)

239. For example, the Santa Cruz and Santo Domingo de Cundiyo grants were considered
for the first time in the CPLC era. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, app. X, at 200–08. The Santa
Cruz Grant was denied its common lands under the 1897 Sandoval precedent. Id. at tbls. 23–24
and accompanying text at 113–18. The Cundiyo Grant was vastly reduced in acreage by the
U.S. Attorney challenges to the Grant boundaries. See Davis, supra note 193 and
accompanying text.
240. Original research on file with authors. Research based on the original Surveyor
General and/or CPLC files at the New Mexico State Records Center and Archives in Santa
Fe, N.M.

914

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

(Continued)

Name of Grant
16. Don Fernando de
Taos
17. Francisco de
Anaya Almazán*
18. Francisco Montes
Vigil*
19. Gervacio Nolan
20. Gijosa
21. Gotera
22. Juan Bautista
Valdez*
23. Juan de Gabaldon
24. Los Serrillos
25. Maragua
26. Mesilla Civil
Colony
27. Ojo Caliente
28. Pajarito
29. Petaca*
30. Plaza Colorado
31. Polvadera*
32. Rancho del Rio
Grande
33. Refugio Civil
Colony
34. San Antonio de las
Huertas
35. San Antonio del
Rio Colorado*
36. San Clemente*
37. San Joaquin del
Nacimiento*
38. San Miguel del
Vado*
39. Santa Fe
40. Albuquerque
41. Socorro*
42. Vallecito de
Lovato*
TOTALS

Final
disposition:
rejection of
grant as
invalid by
CPLC or on
appeal to the
Year initially
U.S.
recommended Supreme
for confirmation Court
1878

Final
disposition:
found to be
valid but
common
lands totally
denied by
CPLC or U.S.
Supreme
Court
x

1878

x

1881
1858
1876
1877

Subject to
review by
subsequent
Surveyor
General &
recommended
for rejection
Final disposition: (rej.) or
acreage reduced reduction in
by CPLC or U.S. acreage (red.
Supreme Court acr.)

(red. acr.)

x
x

x

x

1871

x

1872
1872
1880

x
x

x

1874

x

1874
1887
1875
1886
1882
1860/
1879

x
x

x

x
x

(rej. and red.
acr.)

(red. acr.)
(rej.)

x

1874

x

1862

x

(rej.)

x

(rej.)
(rej. and red.
acr.)

1874

x

1855
1872

x

1879

x

1874
1881
1875

x
x

1875

x
11

(red. acr.)

x

(red. acr.)
(rej.)

5

26

16

* Indicates re-examined by Surveyor General G.W. Julian and either recommended for
rejection or recommended for confirmation with a reduction of acreage
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Grants Confirmed for Total Petitioned Acreage
Year recommended for Year acted upon by
Name of Grant
confirmation
the CPLC
43. Nicolas Duran de
1887
1896
Chavez
44. Cristobal de la Serna
1888
1892
45. Cañon de San Diego
1880
1893
46. Santos Tomas de
1885
1900
Yturbide*
Grants Confirmed for More than Their Petitioned Acreage
Name of Grant
47. Abiquiu
48. Santa Barbara
49. Atrisco
50. Sevilleta
51. San Marco Pueblo*
52. Dona Ana Bend
Colony
53. Caja del Rio

Year recommended for Year acted upon by
confirmation
the CPLC
1885
1894
1879
1894
1885
1894
1874
1893
1873
1892
1874

1896

1872

1893

Grants With No Proceeding in CPLC on Merits of Claim

Name of
Grant

Year
recommended
for
confirmation

54. Jose
Trujillo

1878

55. El Rito

1870

56.
Antonio de
Salazar*

1882

Likely reason for lack of proceeding on
merits
All land within this claim had already
been confirmed as parts of Pueblo grants
by Congress so CPLC probably lacked
jurisdiction.
Most land within this claim had already
been confirmed by the CPLC as part of the
Juan José Lovato Grant so CPLC probably
lacked jurisdiction.
Most land within this claim had already
been confirmed by the CPLC as a part of
the Bartolome Sanchez and so the CPLC
probably lacked jurisdiction.
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VI. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS
For years, lawyers, scholars, and activists have argued there were
violations of constitutional due process guarantees in the land grant
confirmation process in New Mexico. Such concerns are based on the
guarantees of the U.S. Constitution, made applicable to the states, that no
property rights shall be denied “without due process of law.”241 The
principal concerns regarding the federal confirmation process are: (1) the
inadequacy of publication notice of pending claims under the Surveyor
General to potential grantees and possible third-party claimants; (2) the lack
of any procedure to address such third-party claims before the Surveyor
General; (3) third-party claimants not being systematically brought into
CPLC adjudications, resulting in arguably incorrect confirmations and
third-party claims being forever barred; and (4) the adversarial process
under the CPLC in which claimants were forced to defend their claims
against government attorneys but with vastly fewer resources.242
The GAO Report concludes that the process was constitutionally
sufficient, focusing in large part on the erroneous premise, discussed at
length in Part III above, that the confirmations were not “final”
determinations because third parties could still assert their claims
collaterally in the state courts.243 The GAO’s analysis ignores relevant case
law, the realities of the time, and the fact that such confirmations were in
fact final as to all potential claimants.
A. Surveyor General Era
As discussed by the GAO, during the Surveyor General era the
Surveyor General published notices in the Santa Fe newspaper requiring
claimants to present land grant claims to the Surveyor General in Santa Fe
for confirmation.244 Although the Surveyor General was specifically directed
to attempt to ascertain names of grantees of the various land grants through
an examination of the Spanish and Mexican records in Santa Fe,245 there is
no evidence that he did so, or if he did, that he ever attempted to give notice
to such grantees. Thus, claimants were not generally notified of pending
claims whose validity, boundaries, or ownership they might contest. Once
a claimant came before the Surveyor General, occasionally witnesses were

241. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
242. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 125 n.107 (citing several examples of these
criticisms).
243. See discussion supra Part III.
244. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 57, 59.
245. See id. at 193–97 (Instructions of Interior Issued to the Surveyor General of New
Mexico).
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cross-examined or additional witnesses called, but notice was rarely if ever
given to potential adverse claimants of such claims, resulting in largely ex
parte decisions.246
Contrary to the GAO’s conclusion, this lack of notice appears to
have been constitutionally unsound under both the traditional and modern
notice standards. In the modern case of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.,247 the U.S. Supreme Court held that notice must be “reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.”248 In so holding, Mullane restated the traditional principle that
the requisite degree of due process—in particular, the type of notice and the
opportunity to be heard—always depends on all of the circumstances of the
particular deprivation, rather than there being any precise formula for what
process is due.249
Mullane itself was not a meaningful departure from the due process
standard that had existed up to that point, at least insofar as it affected New
Mexico land grant claimants, contrary to the claims of the GAO.250 Rather,
the modern test of constitutional notice, i.e., “reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections,” appears
to been the modern equivalent of the notice standards for adjudications
involving land grants even in nineteenth-century New Mexico.251 The GAO
contends that, up until Mullane, notice by publication was sufficient for
proceedings involving land adjudications.252 In the case of New Mexico land
grants, however, the legal foundation for the in rem vs. in personam
distinction (i.e., the fact that property holders may be beyond the
jurisdictional reach of the state), was simply not present, so Mullane did not
change the inapplicable standard. As Mullane emphasized, the precise
circumstances of any situation have always determined the amount of
process that is due. The cases upon which the GAO relies are inapplicable

246. See id. at 60, 69 (quoting Surveyor General Clark’s statements questioning the legality
of this process). Although theoretically such notice was permitted under the Act of 1854, id.
at 56 (quoting section 8 of Act), the lack of resources provided to the Surveyor General in New
Mexico meant that potential adverse claimants were rarely made aware of pending claims.
Id. at 69.
247. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
248. Id. at 314.
249. See id. (citing more than 50 years of case law for its proposition).
250. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 128–29.
251. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. La Cueva Ranch Co., 17 N.M. 246, 257–58, 134 P. 228, 231–32
(1912); Priest v. Town of Las Vegas, 16 N.M. 692, 696, 120 P. 894, 895 (1911), aff’d, 232 U.S. 604
(1914).
252. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 127–34 (distinguishing constitutional notice in “in rem”
or “quasi in rem” from that required in “in personam” proceedings).
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to New Mexico land grants and fail to support its blanket proposition that,
pre-Mullane, newspaper notice was constitutionally sufficient.
For instance, Arndt v. Griggs,253 cited by the GAO for the proposition
that publication notice was acceptable for in rem proceedings, held that due
process was satisfied by publishing notice to non-resident owners of property
located within the state; but its reasoning is inapplicable where property
owners are located in-state. Likewise, in Walker v. City of Hutchinson,254 the
Court rejected the state’s argument that notice by newspaper publication in
a condemnation action was permissible under Huling v. Kaw Valley Railway
& Improvement Co.,255 a case also relied on by the GAO.256 Walker held that
the state’s reliance on Huling was “misplaced” since the appellant in Walker,
unlike the railroad in Huling, was a resident of the state in which the
property was located.257 The Court held Huling was inapplicable where the
person in question was a resident of the state where the property was
located.258 Clearly, even in the late 1800s, notice by publication was
disfavored and only acceptable where the state’s powers to hail a person
into court by other means were constrained.259
Even if the cases cited by the GAO were applicable to the
publication notice given by the Surveyor General—despite the fact that
newspapers in those states were commonly used and property holders were
out of state, unlike in New Mexico—they suggest that notice of the action
should be given by posting such notice on the property in question, in
addition to newspaper publication. For instance, in The Mary,260 used by the
GAO for its argument that constructive notice suffices for property
proceedings, personal notice was not required were the property in
question, a vessel, was physically seized. The equivalent notice in the case

253. Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 320–21 (1890).
254. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
255. Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 559 (1889).
256. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 128 n.114.
257. Walker, 352 U.S. at 116 (distinguishing Huling, which sanctioned publication notice
where the railroad was out-of-state).
258. Id.
259. See Emily Riley, Practicalities & Peculiarities: The Heightened Due Process Standard for
Notice Under Jones v. Flower, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N L. JUD. 209 (2007). Further, cases allowing notice
by publication in quasi in rem proceedings did so based on a presumption that publication of
proceedings affecting property rights was a commonly used technique, and that therefore a
prudent property holder would be expected to take notice by reading the newspaper. See
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 132. In addition to the low literacy rate in New Mexico, as
discussed below, notice by publication was not authorized in New Mexico until 1874, and
therefore property holders in the territory would have no such expectation. Applying such
a presumption arguably violates the principles of fairness on which due process is premised.
260. Mary, 13 U.S. 126, 144 (1815).
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of land grants would be at least a posting on the property, not publication
in a regional newspaper.
Similarly, Huling, relied upon by the GAO to support its argument
that publication provided sufficient notice to all potential claimants, was a
situation involving property holders who were not residents in the
state/territory, and therefore could not expect to be personally served.261
Such absentee property-holders were expected to take notice of information
in publications where their property was located. The rationale for allowing
for notice by publication in cases involving property was based in part on
the Court’s judgment that property owners should monitor and guard
activities that could affect their property.262 In the case of absentee property
owners, because they are outside the state courts’ jurisdiction and should
not expect personal service of actions involving their property, the Court in
Huling explained it is their responsibility to monitor the newspapers, or
have a representative do so, since this is the most reasonable way for them
to learn of any such action.263 This principle is inapplicable to residents of
a land grant where landowners lived on the land, so even under these cases
something more than published notice would be required.
Even under the standard as articulated by Mullane, the GAO claims
that notice to claimants by newspaper alone was “reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”264
However, Mullane itself considered notice by publication alone to be
constitutionally suspect, particularly when any other type of feasible notice
was more reasonably calculated to alert individuals of the potential
deprivation.265 This holding was consistent with earlier Supreme Court

261. Huling, 130 U.S. at 563–64.
262. See Mary, 13 U.S. at 144.
263. See Huling, 130 U.S. at 563–64. Clearly, however, the appointment of such a
representative would be ineffective if neither the property is described nor the land owner
identified in the published notice. In such a case, there is no way for either the representative
or the owner to know when the owner’s property is being affected.
264. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 131. Further, the GAO claims notice must have been
reasonable, since claimants filed claims in 130 of 154 community grants, and 208 of the 295
total grants. Id. at 131. The GAO disregards the fact that some of the individuals who
advanced claims were not the true owners, e.g., Tierra Amarilla, or that individuals
advancing the claim may not have been representative of the entire community in the case of
community grants, resulting in numbers of improper confirmations.
265. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 316 (1950) (“[P]ublication
traditionally has been acceptable as notification supplemental to other action which in itself
may reasonably be expected to convey a warning.”).
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cases from the mid-to-late 1800s, during the same time period as the land
grant adjudication process in New Mexico.266
Further, the GAO overlooks the realities of nineteenth-century New
Mexico, and the fact that such notice was unlikely in fact to inform potential
claimants of their rights, much less any adverse claims. At the time, New
Mexico had an extremely low literacy rate and few individuals could have
even read the notices. In 1851, the first census of New Mexico taken by the
U.S. Department of State reported a total population of 56,984; of those,
seven-eighths were illiterate.267 It is questionable whether notice by
publication could ever be reasonably calculated to inform individuals in
such circumstances.268 Further, newspaper notification was not authorized
under New Mexico law until 1874, so there would have been no expectation
that any information concerning the legal taking of property would be
found in the newspaper. At that point a landowner would arguably have
looked to local newspapers for information concerning his property, rather
than to the regional newspaper in Santa Fe.
In addition, there were several methods of notice which were
certainly “feasible” and would have been “substantially more likely to give
notice of the action” than simple publication by newspaper.269 As discussed
above, the Surveyor General was required to ascertain names of grantees,
as well as probable locations of both the land and grantees; certainly the
notices could have been sent to the named grantees at the post office
servicing the location of the land. The notice could have been posted on the
land under consideration and at the post office in the district in which the
land was situated. Additionally, the notice could have been published in
local newspapers or in the churches, stores, and meeting places in the areas
under consideration. In any of these cases, the method of notification
arguably would have made an illiterate land grant claimant aware of
proceedings potentially affecting the claimant’s property interests.
In claiming publication notice satisfied the reasonableness standard
of Mullane, the GAO does not even mention the two New Mexico cases that
addressed the “reasonableness” of publication notice in the context of land

266. See, e.g., Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1878) (in tax assessment action,
in accordance with constitutional due process, statute properly required the government to
give personal service to those who were known, to search for those who were unknown, and
to publish notice in the newspaper in which the property was located to all those who could
not be found or were unknown).
267. Territorial Papers: New Mexico, I, Records Group 59, National Archives, Washington
D.C.; ROBERT LARSON, NEW MEXICO’S QUEST FOR STATEHOOD 1846–1912 65 (1968).
268. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799 (1983) (“[P]articularly
extensive efforts to provide notice may often be required when the State is aware of a party’s
inexperience or incompetence.”).
269. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318; Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002).
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grant cases and reached the opposite result. In Rodriguez v. La Cueva Ranch
Co., the state supreme court held the inclusion of “unknown claimants” in
a partition decree was insufficient under the state’s notice statute to satisfy
due process because the claimants were reasonably ascertainable.270
Although La Cueva was a state law rather than federal constitutional
decision, it was based on what was considered reasonable notice at the time,
and in considering reasonableness, the presence of people on the land was
a factor that should be taken into account in determining whether potential
claimants were reasonably ascertainable.271
Likewise, in Priest v. Town of Las Vegas,272 the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that parties seeking to enforce a quiet title decree within the Las
Vegas Land Grant did not satisfy statutory or constitutional due process by
publishing notice to “unknown heirs” when such claimants, including the
town itself, were reasonably ascertainable and could be named and served
personally.273 The parties argued that although the grant had been
confirmed to the town by Congress in 1860, the town was not incorporated
until much later and therefore the parties did not known who to serve (as
the town “was a mere aggregation of people without corporate
organization”). The court rejected this argument, as there was no obstacle
to naming the town in the notice, and the Supreme Court had previously
held, in Maese v. Herman, that the town was a sufficiently “substantial
entity” to receive a patent to the grant.274 Priest underscores that notice by
publication in land matters was not automatically constitutionally sound
pre-Mullane, and that the determination rested on the precise circumstances,
the feasibility of alternative methods, and the difficulty of ascertaining the
interested parties.
In addition to concerns about the insufficiency of notice given to
potential claimants, and on a related note, scholars have pointed to the
largely ex parte nature of Surveyor General proceedings and the lack of
opportunity for adverse parties to be heard in proceedings that affected
them—another touchstone of constitutional due process. Not surprisingly,
the GAO concludes that provisions such as the opportunity for adverse
parties to appear and for cross-examination were not constitutionally
required in the Surveyor General process.275 Here the GAO reiterated the
flexible nature of the type of procedures constitutionality required, both
traditionally and under the U.S. Supreme Court’s present-day analysis in

270.
271.
272.
(1914).
273.
274.
275.

Rodriguez v. La Cueva Ranch Co., 17 N.M. 246, 257–58, 134 P. 228, 231–32 (1912).
See id.
Priest v. Town of Las Vegas, 16 N.M. 692, 120 P. 894 (1911), aff’d, 232 U.S. 604, 614
Id. at 697–98, 120 P. at 896.
Id. at 699, 120 P. at 896 (citing Maese v. Herman, 183 U.S. 572 (1902)).
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 134–39.
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Mathews v. Eldridge, depending on: (1) the private interests affected; (2) the
risk of erroneous deprivation; and (3) the government’s interest in not
providing the particular safeguard. The GAO concluded that the relatively
uncomplicated, “investigative” process by the Surveyor General did not
require the right to a formal hearing, with the full participation of adverse
parties and the constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses.276
As discussed above, the GAO relies heavily on the notion that
confirmations under the 1854 Act were not final as to potential third-party
rights, nor did the proceedings even seem to involve the rights of third
parties, so that fewer due process safeguards were required under the
Mathews balancing test.277 This error had a significant impact on the GAO’s
determination of what protections were constitutionally required, in
particular causing it to vastly underestimate the third-party interests
involved in each confirmation, in addition to the significant risk of
erroneous deprivation to third-party claimants. While the GAO insisted
that, under cases such as United States v. O’Donnell,278 there was simply no
obligation to require an adversarial process in Surveyor General
proceedings, such arguments ignore the fact that, in many ways unlike the
California Commission process, Surveyors’ General recommendations—
being unappealable to the courts and consistently adhered to by
Congress—were in fact final and binding.
Perhaps most surprising of all, the GAO contends land grant
claimants under the Surveyor General process may not have even been
entitled to any due process protections, since the Surveyor General was “not
empowered to determine legal rights…[or] actually deprive [any] person
of life, liberty, or property,” again relying on distinguishable cases.279 The
GAO likened the Surveyor General process to Hannah v. Larche,280 in which
a commission merely investigated, rather than acted on, civil rights claims
and therefore truncated due process was permissible. This was in contrast
to Jenkins v. McKeithen,281 which involved a commission that conducted
adjudicative proceedings where full due process was required. The GAO
concluded the Surveyor General process was arguably more of an
investigative fact-finder, as in Hannah, and hence did not have to provide
the due process required for actual determinations or deprivations of legal
rights. The GAO’s claims are tenuous in light of the realities of the federal
confirmation process and the fact that Congress consistently followed the

276. Id. at 135–37.
277. Id. at 135–40.
278. United States v. O’Donnell, 303 U.S. 501 (1938) (addressing concerns regarding the
California confirmation process).
279. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 129–30.
280. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
281. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
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favorable recommendations by New Mexico’s Surveyors General, thereby
permanently deciding legal rights and extinguishing others. Even the GAO
concedes, after proferring its initial claim, that the land grant situation was
more akin to the facts in Jenkins, where individual property rights were
irrevocably affected by commission action, than to those in Hannah.282
B. Court of Private Land Claims Era
Although the GAO does not address any due process concerns from
the CPLC process, several have been noted by land grant scholars and
lawyers that bear mention. In particular, critics note that, under the
adversarial CPLC process, the stakes were much higher for claimants and
the risks of erroneous determinations greater, yet the procedure still lacked
fundamental protections such as the systematic joinder and participation of
third-party claimants.283 In cases such as the Juan Jose Lobato, Cundiyó, and
Truchas land grants, for instance, claims proceeded through the CPLC
process without evidence of adverse claimants being made aware of such
pending claims. In other cases, such as the Pueblo Quemado Grant,
claimants were made aware of possible adverse claimants but there is no
evidence that notice was ever provided to most of those potential third
parties of the pending claim.284
Further, while the GAO notes the increasingly adversarial nature
of the proceedings and exclusion of a number of presumptions that aided
claimants under the Act of 1854,285 concluding that such decisions were up
to Congress (subject to due process, which it claims was satisfied), the GAO
ignores some of the deeper systemic problems that arguably violated the
procedural due process rights of claimants in the CPLC era. The fact that
the action was adversarial in nature, was initiated under direction from the
government286 and prosecuted by U.S. attorneys against poor and often
illiterate individuals, and often involved a complete deprivation of Treatyprotected property rights, arguably warranted additional due process
safeguards under Mathews v. Eldridge. In particular, the vastly differing
resources between land grant claimants and government attorneys
substantially increased the risk of erroneous deprivation to claimants. These
and other due process concerns under the CPLC process, omitted entirely
from the GAO Report, certainly deserve additional analysis and scrutiny.

282. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 130–31.
283. See, e.g., EBRIGHT, supra note 34, at 46–48.
284. See Davis, supra note 193, at 25, 28–29.
285. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 78–81.
286. Id. at 80–81. Although the Act of 1891 did not require perfect claims to be brought
before the CPLC, the GAO recognizes that this was the practical effect of the Act, given that
land was not set aside from the public domain pending resolution of claims. Id. at 80–81.
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C. The Finality of Confirmations Under Both Processes
These apparent due process violations were particularly egregious
in light of the finality of land grant confirmations under the Surveyor
General and adverse claimants’ inability to collaterally challenge such
confirmations.287 Throughout its due process discussion, the GAO relies
heavily on the notion that the Surveyor General confirmation process did
not require such rigorous due process since it did not constitute a final
decision, the confirmation being ultimately up to Congress.288
As discussed above, the GAO’s contentions regarding the lack of
finality could not be further from the truth. Rather, recommendations by the
Surveyor General and decisions under the CPLC process sealed the fate of
land grants and in only very limited, rare circumstances were subject to
collateral attack by third parties in the courts. The GAO’s analysis
throughout this section should be reviewed in light of its misplaced reliance
on this notion, supported only by the anomalous New Mexico district court
decision in Montoya v. Tecolote, since reversed by the court of appeals.
In particular, the following points made by the GAO should be
reviewed in light of the GAO’s erroneous reliance on the “Montoya”
principle: (1) the notion that the Surveyor General process was not final, in
light of Montoya-type opportunities to establish title, and so required less
rigorous notice to possible claimants;289 (2) the notion that this lack of
finality required fewer due process touchstones such as opportunities for
cross-examination and prohibitions on ex parte proceedings; 290 (3) the notion
that the Surveyor General only “determine[d] who owned a tract as
between a claimant and the United States…, not who owned the land as
between all parties,”and that this meant no potential adverse claimants,
other than the United States, were constitutionally entitled to cross-examine
potential claimants, much less even appear in the proceedings;291 (4) the notion
that third-party claimants were in an even “better position” than the parties
in Hannah, who were constitutionally denied the right to cross-examination,
in light of the opportunity for “second-bite at the apple” under the Montoya
principle;292 and (5) the notion that the existence of a Montoya-type “postdeprivation” hearing would justify any due process violation that may have
occurred in the confirmation process.293 Particularly in light of the GAO’s

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See discussion supra Part III.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 132–40.
Id. at 132.
Id.
Id. at 136–37.
Id. at 137.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 138.
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erroneous reliance on the since-overturned Montoya case, Congress should
reconsider whether the federal government complied with constitutional
due process when it deprived land grant claimants of their land grant rights
in the confirmation process.
CONCLUSION
Clearly there are a number of reasons to dispute the GAO Report’s
conclusion that there was no legal violation in the confirmation process
warranting relief by the federal government. Of these, the most significant
are surely the GAO’s superficial analysis of Treaty rights and problematic
case law following the Treaty; its flawed analysis regarding the
misconfirmation of the majority of New Mexico’s community land grants;
its erroneous conclusion that third parties could collaterally attack federal
confirmations and the implications of this irreversibility; and its problematic
analysis regarding constitutional due process.
Even the GAO concedes that, as a matter of policy “or even law,”294
Congress may want to consider some sort of remedy to New Mexico land
grant heirs in light of the many serious problems in the federal confirmation
process.295 For instance, the GAO suggests Congress may want to
legislatively overrule United States v. Sandoval; such a remedy may also be
appropriate for Supreme Court cases such as Botiller v. Dominguez, which
arguably misapplied the Treaty and federal statutes enacted under the
Treaty, as well as Hayes v. United States and United States v. Vigil, which
were decided on technical grounds in arguable contravention of the Treaty
and federal statute.
Likewise, the GAO suggests Congress may want to establish a
remedy for land grant losses under the federal confirmation in light of the
following concerns with the confirmation process: the excessive burdens
placed on claimants; the insufficient resources resulting in scant notice and
other due process safeguards; the fact that the system required claimants to
hire English-speaking lawyers and pay them in land grant land; the fact that
similarly situated grants often fared much worse during the CPLC era than
they would have under the Surveyor General and certainly under Spain or
Mexico; the excessive and crippling costs of surveying required after a
confirmation; and the fact that inalienable common lands under Spain and
Mexico were converted by the government into alienable private lands and
lost forever from many New Mexico communities.296
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If Congress chooses to address the many legal and equitable
problems in the confirmation process, the question remains, what type of
federal remedy is appropriate? The GAO lists several possibilities,
including: (1) taking no additional action at this time because the majority
of the community land grants were “confirmed,” the majority of the acreage
claimed was “awarded,” and the confirmation processes were conducted
“in accordance with U.S. law”; (2) acknowledging difficulties in evaluating
the original claims and that the process could have been more efficient and
less burdensome and imposed fewer hardships on claimants; (3) creating
a commission or some other entity to evaluate and resolve remaining
concerns about individual claims or categories of claims or to reexamine
community land claims that were rejected or not confirmed for the full
acreage claimed; (4) transferring federal land to communities that did not
receive all of the acreage originally claimed for their community land
grants; and (5) making financial payments to heirs or other entities for the
non-use of land originally claimed but not awarded.297
Of these, New Mexico community land grant heirs have historically
advocated most strenuously for the restoration of lands to communities
where common lands were stripped or lost after being recast as private
lands during the confirmation process. Certainly a claims commission could
be established to evaluate such instances and possible land transactions.
Financial payment is less attractive to most community land grant heirs, as
money is never a substitute for land—particularly the land of one’s
ancestors—but could be appropriate in certain limited circumstances in
which heirs could purchase comparable neighboring land.
In the past, Congress has shown an ability to provide such a
remedy when it has had the political will to do so. For instance, in the case
of the Santa Fe and Albuquerque land grants, Congress passed individual
acts recognizing these grants after the CPLC rejected both grants as being
based on equitable claims that lay beyond its jurisdiction.298 New Mexico’s
land grant heirs are hopeful that Congress will consider both the legal and
equitable concerns regarding the loss of so much of New Mexico’s common
lands and community land grants, and will find an appropriate remedy to
address such concerns. These concerns are just as palpable and painful
today as they were a century ago for land grant heirs and for New Mexico
as a whole.
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